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Abstract 
The paper aims to provide a representation, as rich and complete as possible, of the Chinese 
labour market, both in terms of stock and flow, despite the fact that the statistical information 
is still rather poor and often inconsistent. It does then document the increasing differences in 
the level and trends of the main labour market variables at the provincial level.  
In order to reach a deeper comprehension of the dynamic of the Chinese labour market, the 
paper analyses two other extremely relevant phenomena: the so called “floating population” 
and the labour shortages that are more and more frequently affecting the coastal regions. 
After having provided a demographic background to the Lewis model of development with 
unlimited supply of labour, the paper shows in which periods China has been obliged to 
accumulate a large labour surplus, mainly in the agricultural sector, and in which periods and 
through  which  mechanisms,  including  ageing  and  internal  migration,  the  process  of  de-
accumulation has taken place. More specifically, the paper shows how up to now internal 
migrations have provided urban areas and coastal regions with an unlimited supply of labour, 
a factor that has played a major role in boosting the Chinese economic development and 
determining its typology. In order to reach this result, simple demographic tools have been 
utilized to estimate the net migration balance of each province and in each province of rural 
and urban areas, and therefore to define areas of departures and areas of arrival, information 
not provided by the literature on the floating population. Finally the paper provides a rough 
estimate of the disguised unemployment in agriculture and of its geographical distribution. 
After assessing which percentage can represent a possible supply of labour for the modern 
sector, it will be maintained that China not only is very close to the Lewis turning point (a 
situation that has already been reached in many coastal areas), but is going to become the 
world biggest importer of labour.  
In order to provide its population with living standards comparable to that of the western 
world, in a reasonable time interval, China needs to continue to grow at an extremely high 
rate. This will require the capacity to deal with a series of structural problems. Limiting our 
concerns to the labour market, that is characterized by increasing complexity and regional 
differentiation,  high  priority  should  be  given  to  improve  the  collection,  analysis  and 
dissemination of labour market data; to abolish the one child policy that is totally obsolete in 
a situation that will be soon characterized by a structural lack of labour supply; to give to the 
Chinese citizens the right to freely move and change residence, while rapidly regularizing the 
existing floating population; to raise the legal age of retirement; to plan and implement a 
structure of t entries in vocational courses and higher educational paths coherent with the 
expected structure of the labour demand in terms of flows by occupation; to strengthen the 
Employment  service  system  in  order  to  improve  skills  matching  at  the  local  level,  and 
facilitate the correct allocation of human resources over the national territory, in order to 
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The bird must not be held tightly in 
the hand or it will die. It should fly, 
but only within the cage; without the 
cage it will just fly away. If the bird is 
a  market  economy,  then  the  cage  is 
state  planning.  Naturally  the  size  of 
the cage has to be appropriate. 
Chen Yun, 1995 
 
1. Introduction  
Very  few  papers  have  been  devoted  to  explore  the  structure  and  evolution  of  the 
Chinese labour market
1. Moreover, to our knowledge, the approach has generally been global 
and  analyses  of  regional  differences  and  peculiarities  are  almost  totally  lacking.  This  is 
particularly  striking  when  we  consider  that  3 of  the  31  provinces  and  municipalities  that 
compose China have more than 90 million inhabitants
2, 7 between 50 and 90 and 9 between 
30  and  50.  Together  with  the  fact  that  up  to  very  recently
3 labour  was  not  viewed  as  a 
problem, this situation is partially justified by the lack of suitable and reliable data.  
In China the system of labour market data collection
4 has changed through time to 
adapt to the passage from a command economy to a market based economy. In a first phase, 
the collection of statistical information was based on administrative procedures and records
5. 
The  introduction  of  a  market  based  economy  provoked,  on  one  hand,  the  appearance  of 
identifiable unemployment and, on the other, made increasingly difficult to maintain an up to-
date  list  of  employers,  while  the  growing  private  sector  was  progressively  reducing  the 
economic and statistical relevance of the data of the employed in the public sector.  
To face the first problem, starting at the end of the ‘70s, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security began to collect information on the unemployed registered at the Job Centers. 
The number of registered unemployed is, however, historically lower than what we would 
obtain using the ILO definition due to the limited number of categories allowed to register 
and to the lack of financial incentives for first job seekers, particularly the young people 
entering the labour market for the first time. 
The  awareness  that  in  a  market  based  economy  only  sample  surveys,  and  more 
specifically  household-based  surveys,  can  provide  a  correct  measure  of  the  main  labour 
market  variables  brought  the  Chinese  authorities,  starting  in  1994,  to  collect  some  basic 
labour market information adding a few questions to the Annual Population Survey
6. Given 
the limits
7 of this approach, a specific Labour Force Survey was introduced in 1997. In a first 
phase the LFS covered only urban areas
8; starting in 2001
9 it has been extended also to rural 
                                                        
1 The literature on Chinese labour market has confronted mainly three problems: the so-called floating population, 
the Lewis turning point and the demographic window. 
2 Germany, the largest EU country, has 82 million inhabitants; Guangdong the largest Chinese province has almost 
100. 
3 The first signs of labour shortages have been signaled in 2004. 
4 For a more detailed analysis, see Laux Richard, Barry Werner, Ian Knight and Kari Djerf, 2003. 
5 The main source of labour market statistics was represented by the Establishment reporting system that had been 
designed  in  order  to  monitor  the  planned  economy;  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  collected  supplementary 
information on employment in township enterprises, and the State Administration for Commerce and Industry 
collected employment data in private enterprises. 
6 The Annual Population Survey has been carried on annual basis, apart from Census years, since 1982. It is based 
on a sample of around 1.2 million people (0.1 per cent of the population) covering both urban and rural areas.  
7 They main limits were related to sample that had been designed to monitor population growth and did not take 
into consideration the specific requisites of surveying employment.   
8 The sample that included 0.4 million people was obtained re-interviewing the people included in the previous 
October’s Population Survey. The results of these Surveys have not been published.  
9 The activation of the National Labour Survey was fostered by a labour force development program funded by the 
European Commission that lasted between 1998 and 2002 and was run by the British Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) and Statistics Finland.    7 
areas and now represents the main source of labour market information.  
However,  both  the  Labour  Force  Survey  and  the  Survey  on  Population  Changes 
provide  only  a  very  rough  image  of  the  main  demographic  and  labour  market  variables: 
absolute  values  are  published  only  for  the  largest  aggregates  and  are  the  result  of 
“adjustments”,  the  provincial  values  do  not  sum  up  to  the  total  and  what  is  in  general 
available are percentage compositions.  
Given our goals and the available statistical information, our analysis has required a 
consistent amount of data homogenization
10 and reconstruction that has often bordered with 
creative statistics. We have tried to follow standard and homogeneous procedures throughout 
the  paper,  and  we  are  convinced  that  in  so  doing  we  have  been  able  to  derive  valuable 
information and provide sufficiently reliable indications on the level, structure and trends of 
the main labour market variables. However, we are also well aware that, given the numerous 
inconsistencies that have emerged analyzing available data, all our conclusions must be taken 
with extreme caution. It is our hope that in showing both the limits and potentialities of 
Chinese labour market statistics we are contributing to show the need for improving data 
collection procedures and raise the interest in the analysis of the Chinese labour market, in a 
phase in which the availability of human resources is becoming a central issue.  
Starting  in  2004
11,  a  few  coastal  areas  have  begun  to  periodically  register  labour 
shortages and more recently this has concurred to determine unprecedented phenomena of 
labour unrest
12. This has brought some Chinese scholars to sustain that the Chinese economy 
is approaching the so called Lewis Turning Point (LTP), i.e. the situation in which the labour 
supply is no more unlimited and labour demand is faced by an upward sloping supply curve.  
The paper will strive to provide a quantitative representation of the main labour market 
variables, documenting the fact that an analysis of the Chinese labour market at the national 
level  is  not  only  insufficient,  but  can  be  misleading  since  territorial  differences  in  the 
endowments of physical and human resources and an unbalanced process of economic growth 
are provoking an increasing differential in the level and trends of the main labour market 
indicators.  
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  a  first  section  we  provide  a  demographic 
background to the Lewis model of development with unlimited supply of labour
13 on the basis 
of  the  standard  demographic  transition  theory.  We  will  point  out  that  the  so-called 
demographic  transition  does  not  affect  only  Total  Population  (TP),  but  also,  and  more 
importantly  from  a  labour  market  perspective,  the  Population  in  Working  Age  (WAP).  
Chinese demographic and labour market data will be used to exemplify this phenomenon, 
while  allowing  to  determining  the  phases  of  labour  accumulation  and  de-accumulation 
experienced  by  China  and  the  connection  of  the  de-accumulation  phase  with  internal 
migrations, the topic to which we will devote the following section of the paper.  
In  the  last  twenty  years  China  has  witnessed  the  largest  migration  phenomenon  in 
human  history
14 that  dwarfs  not  only  the  international  migrations  experienced  by  United 
States and Australia after WW2 and more recently by Europe, but also the great migration of 
the  XIX  century.  Up  to  now  this  phenomenon  has  been  discussed  under  the  euphemistic 
                                                        
10 It must also be acknowledged that a Labour Force Survey has to confront a series of peculiarities of the Chinese 
labour market that make sampling especially difficult (floating population, workers’ hostels), while timing of the 
survey field work must take in consideration not only weather problems but also vacation and reporting habits. 
11 Cai Fang (2008a) and (2008b), Cai Fang and Wang Meyan (2010), 
12 Research by the School of Labor and Human Resources of Renmin University shows that the number of labor-
management disputes (i.e. labor-management confrontations involving more than 10 workers who have the same 
demands) keeps rising in tandem with China's economic expansion. In 1996, about 60,000 such disputes were 
reported in China. By 2007, however, the figure has risen to about 400,000 and shot up further to about 700,000 in 
2008.  
13 W.A. Lewis, 1954 
14 This is underlined also in the introduction of the 2010 Report on China’s Migrant Population Development (p. 
1) published by the Department of Services and Management of Migrant population of National Population and 
Family Planning Commission of China.  
   8 
heading of floating population, that fails to capture the fact that what is taking place is a 
massive and definitive exodus of hundreds of million of people from poor areas, characterized 
by  an  excess  of  labour  supply,  to  coastal  areas  where  an  unlimited  supply  of  labour  has 
played a major role in creating what has been called the factory of the world. We will first 
review the main quantitative results of the literature on the floating population and discuss its 
main shortcomings. We will then use simple demographic tools to estimate net migration 
balances between rural and urban areas and between provinces, information not provided by 
the literature on the floating population.  
The third section of the paper provides a quantitative analysis of the Chinese labour 
market, paying special attention to the period 2003-2008. The analysis is articulated into two 
parts. The first considers the national level from an urban–rural perspective. The analysis in 
terms  of  stock  is  followed  by  an  analysis  based  on  generational  flows.  The  process  of 
urbanization  that  is  affecting  numerous  rural  areas,  while  factories  are  more  and  more 
localized outside cities and towns borders, is making the urban-rural divide progressively less 
meaningful. At the same time interprovincial differences are growing. The second part will, 
therefore, be devoted to provide a tentative characterization of the provincial labour markets. 
Keeping in mind that many Chinese provinces are much bigger than the states that form the 
European Union, that the economic weight of the more developed provinces is growing at an 
exceptional rate, and that local labour market issues will assume a growing importance in 
designing  and  adopting  development  policies,  it  is  evident  that  this  line  of  research  is 
becoming more and more relevant and needed. At the same time, the statistical information 
presently  available  is  largely  insufficient  to  provide  an  adequate  representation  of  the 
provincial labour markets. In this historical phase, characterized by increasing quantitative 
and qualitative unbalances between labour demand and supply, this should be considered an 
absolute priority by the Chinese Statistical Bureau. 
Numerous papers have already suggested that the unlimited supply of labour that has 
played such an important role in sustaining a labour intensive economic growth has reached 
its end, while others have argued that the Chinese agricultural sector is still affected by a large 
number  of  disguised  unemployed.  We  will  argue  that  the  presence  of  disguised 
unemployment represents a necessary but not sufficient condition to guarantee a perfectly 
elastic  supply  of  labour.  Many  elements  (age  structure,  educational  level,  typology  of 
agricultural  development,  and  legislation  together  with  the  length  of  the  time  horizon 
considered) concur in determining whether the excess of labour present in agriculture and in 
the  informal  sector,  both  in  urban  and  rural  areas,  can  provide  additional  supply  for  the 
modern sectors. Working in this direction, we will try providing a rough estimate of disguised 
unemployment in agriculture and we will then analyze its geographical distribution. Finally, 
we  will  try  to  assess  which  percentage  of  this  disguised  unemployment  can  represent  a 
possible component of the supply of labour for the modern sector. Finally we will maintain, 
also on the basis of demographic and labour market scenarios, that China not only is very 
close to the Lewis turning point (that has already certainly be reached in many coastal areas), 
but that China is going to become not only the biggest economy in the world, but also the 
biggest importer of labour.  
After briefly summarizing the main results emerged from our analysis, we will discuss 
their implication in terms of policies, paying special attention to labour market issues. We 
will suggest that the present situation of the Chinese labour market, seen in the context of the 
expected demographic evolution of the country, requires that high priority should be given to 
improve the collection, analysis and dissemination of labour market data, the regularization of 
internal migrants, the abolition of the one child policy, to raise the legal age of retirement.  
2. A revisit of Lewis model: unlimited supply of labour and demographic transition. 
In his 1954 seminal  paper  on development with  unlimited supply of labour, Lewis 
starts  from  the  assumption  that  many  underdeveloped  countries  are  characterized  by  a 
situation “where population is so large relatively to capital and natural resources, that there   9 
are large sectors of the economy where the marginal productivity of labour is negligible, zero 
or  even  negative”
15.  According  to  Lewis,  disguised  unemployment  of  unskilled  labour  is 
present not only in agriculture, but also in other sectors, such as domestic services and petty 
retail trading. In this situation, while there is no interest in raising the productivity of the 
subsistence  sector,  the  capitalist  sector  can  expand  paying  wages  slightly  above  the 
subsistence  level,  as  long  as  it  can  take  advantage  of  the  excess  supply  of  labour  in  the 
subsistence sector.  
Lewis analysis did not pay much attention to the problem of how the unlimited supply 
of labour does come into existence, nor did he consider the impact of demographic trends and 
of the passage of time on the de-accumulation of the labour surplus. In fact, he only observed 
that surplus labour can be increased by demographic growth, while it can be exhausted also if 
population is growing, given an investment rate high enough to allow for an expansion of 
employment larger than the increase in labour supply
16.  
The lack of attention to demographic dynamics is totally justified since at the time the 
article was written nobody could have suspected that the so called demographic transition -
that had already affected Europe for long time, but was in a stage in which demographic 
growth was taking place at a slow, but positive rate- would enter a phase in which the fertility 
rates  of  developed  countries  would  rapidly  drop  below  the  replacement  level  and  that 
numerous at the time undeveloped countries would go through the demographic transition at a 
much more faster pace than developed countries.   
From  our  vantage  point,  we  can  now  integrate  Lewis  analysis  with  a  demographic 
background  that  takes  into  consideration  the  demographic  transformation  that  is  by  now 
affecting all the countries in the world and has been particularly fast in China. This will allow 
understanding the origin of the labour surplus, considering all the possible causes of its de-
accumulation  and  their  relative  role  in  the  final  stages  of  the  process,  and  analyzing  the 
situation that can arise after the Lewis turning point has been reached.  
The demographic transition was originally described as the transition from a traditional 
demographic regime, characterized by high fertility and mortality rates, to a modern regime 
characterized  by  low  fertility  and  mortality  rates:  in  substance,  as  the  passage  from  a 
traditional demographic equilibrium to a modern demographic equilibrium
17. It is by now 
evident that, for a long time to come, the demographic revolution
18 that has been affecting, 
although  with  different  intensity  and  timing,  all  the  countries  of  the  world  will  provoke 
negative natural balances, in many instances of considerable size
19. 
Up to now the interest of demographers and economists has been concentrated mainly 
on  the  consequences  of  the  demographic  transition  of  the  Total  Population  (TP);  from  a 
labour  market  perspective,  it  is  at  least  equally  important  to  underline  that  the  so-called 
demographic transition implies an analogous transition of Working Age Population (WAP).  
The speed of economic growth and social development coupled with the adoption of 
the  “one  child  policy”20,  have  pushed  China  trough  both  demographic  transitions  at  an 
extremely fast speed. China represents, therefore, a perfect case study to exemplify our thesis.  
                                                        
15 W.A. Lewis, 1954. 
16 Ibidem 
17 Chesnais J.C., 1986. 
18 Since the decline in fertility has not stopped around the mark of 2.1 children per woman, that would assure 
stability in the level of total population, and for the moment such a result is not foreseeable for any economy, the 
concept of transition, that implies a passage from one situation of equilibrium to another situation of equilibrium, 
does  not  apply.  It  seems  therefore  more  appropriate  to  speak  of  demographic  transformation  or  revolution; 
however in order to avoid misunderstanding we will continue to use the terminology of demographic transition. 
19 For a discussion of this issue and its consequences for international migration see M. Bruni, 2009. 
20 China has experienced a dramatic decline in fertility, the TFR having plunged from a value of more than 6 
children per woman at the beginning of the ‘50s to a present value estimated between 1.74 and 1.77. The role of 
the  “one  child  policy”  -according  to  Wang  Feng  (2005)  “the  largest  and  most  extreme  social  experiment  in 
population growth control via government intervention in human reproduction in world history”- on the decline of 
fertility and on the Chinese society as a whole is a debated issue. On one hand, the Chinese government underlines 
that: “China has accomplished a historic transition in population reproduction pattern from one featuring high birth 
rate, low death rate and high growth rate to one featuring low birth rate, low death rate and low growth rate in a   10 
The  following  graphs,  based  on  elaborations  of  data  published  by  the  Population 
Division  of  the  United  Nations
21,  summarize  the  main  demographic  tendencies  that  have 
affected China since around 1950 and are expected to prevail in the next forty years
22. They 
represent, respectively:  
•  The yearly average number of births and deaths and the Natural balance of TP (graph 
1);  
•  The yearly number of entries into and exits from WAP and the WAP Natural balance 
(graph 2).  
 In both cases we can distinguish three consecutive phases. In the first, the Natural 
balance progressively increases; in the second, the Natural balance progressively declines and 
reaches a value of zero; in the third, the Natural balance is negative, and presents increasing 
absolute values. Therefore, in the first phase, TP and WAP increase at an increasing rate; in 
the  second,  they  increase  at  a  declining  rate;  in  the  third,  they  decline.  Some  notable 
differences  between  the  transition  of  TP  and  WAP  must  however  be  underlined,  and  the 
Chinese case well exemplifies them.  
In the first phase of the TP transition, the increase in the Natural balance is provoked 
by a parallel decline in deaths and increase in births, the first phenomenon playing the major 
role. In China this phase lasted until 1970. Analogously, the increase in WAP Natural balance 
                                                        
relatively short period of time, a change that took decades or even up to a hundred years for developed countries to 
realize in the past” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2000); on the other, 
the literature points out a series of costs that the country has paid for the one-child policy: a growing proportion of 
elderly with inadequate government or family support, a disproportionately high number of male births attributable 
to sex selective abortion, increased female infant and child mortality rates, the collapse of a credible government 
birth reporting system, the violations of human rights, the forceful alteration of China’s traditional family structure 
(Wang Feng, 2005).  
The one-child policy was the end results of previous family planning measures. In 1953 the Chinese government 
started to provide family planning services as a contribution to maternal and child health. In 1970, the fourth five-
year plan included, for the first time, targets for population growth rate. Contraceptive and abortion services were 
then extended to the rural areas, and there was extensive promotion of later marriage, longer intervals between 
births, and smaller families, the so-called “later, longer, fewer” policy. Judging from the results, these earlier 
intervention were rather successful so that by around 1980 the TFR had dropped to 2.7. However the result was 
considered  not  sufficient  to  ensure  socio-economic  development  and  the  one-child  policy  was  approved  and 
implemented at the beginning of the ‘80s. During the first ten year, the period in which the one child policy was 
more harshly implemented, the TFR remained substantially stable. We must however remember that in 1980 
China reduced the legal age for marriage and in 1984 in some areas couples were allowed to have two children, 
both measures being followed by an increase in fertility. It was in the following 20 years that the TFR registered a 
dramatic decline falling below replacement level. In this period the homogeneity of the one-child policy was 
abandoned in favor of an extremely articulated and diversified approach so that the one child policy, evolved in to 
a multi-policy regime. Moreover, starting at the end of the 1990’s, China shifted the focus of its birth control 
program away from administrative coercion toward encouraging voluntary contraception and providing couples 
with a wider selection of contraceptive methods. Moreover, starting at the end of the 1990’s, China shifted the 
focus of its birth control program away from administrative coercion toward encouraging voluntary contraception 
and  providing  couples  with  a  wider  selection  of  contraceptive  methods.  During  the  same  period  China  was 
affected by all the phenomena that are normally associated with declines in fertility: the employment level in 
agriculture sharply fell, while the percentage of urban population rapidly expanded and the level of educational 
attainment and the average standard of living increased. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to evaluate in which 
measure the decline in fertility has been due to population planning and in which measure to socio-economic-
development; even more difficult to evaluate the impact of abolishing the one child policy. A series of element do 
however support the idea that Chinese observers have been largely overestimated the specific impact of the one 
child policy. In the first place the progressive articulation of the one child policy has brought to what is in fact a 
1.5 child policy. In the second place the rate of fertility is not homogeneous over the territory. According to 
Chinese data, the TFR is 1.4 in urban areas and 1.92 in rural areas and this suggests that environmental factors 
play an important role and that the process of urbanization could play a major role in reducing fertility. It could 
also be argued that the introduction of the one-child policy has contributed to progressively transform the attitude 
of the young couples bringing them to feel that having only one child is a logical way to cope with the growing 
lack of family support and to better provide to their children. 
21 Population Division, 2009. 
22The data in Graph. 1 are three year moving averages of the data published by the Population Division in its 2008 
Revision of the Highlights of the World Population Prospects; the data in Graph 2 are three five year periods 
moving averages of our elaborations based on data published by the same source; Population Division, 2009.    11 
was caused by a contemporary increase in entries and decline in exits. In this case, however, 
the major role was played by entries. Moreover, the Natural balance of WAP peaks with a 
delay of 15 years with respect to that of TP, a time span that corresponds to the number of 
cohorts of the first main age group (0-14). 
In the second phase, the decline in the Natural balance of TP is determined by a parallel 
decline in births and increase in deaths. According to the Population Division of the United 
Nations, in China this phase is expected to last around 55 year and end in 2025. The decline 
in the Natural balance of WAP, provoked mainly by an increase in exits, but also, after the 
beginning of the century, by a fast decline in entries proceeds at a much faster pace, due to the 
lower impact of ageing in this segment of the population. According to the same source, this 




The existence of the third phase, in which both WAP and TP will progressively decline 
was not forecasted until very recently
23, while different assessments have been made of the 
demographic, economic and labour market implications of this phenomenon. The prevailing 
opinion is that WAP and TP will in fact decline with negative consequences on the level of 
labour force, employment and production. Another possibility, already sustained by one of 
the author
24 is that the decline in WAP will provoke a structural lack of labour supply that 
will induce migration flows sufficient to determine an increase both in WAP and TP, also 
through a positive impact on fertility.  
Graph 3 represents together the natural balance of TP and WAP allowing to compare 




23 As suggested also by the terminology adopted, one of the basic assumptions of the theory of the demographic 
transition was that the decline in the fertility rate would have leveled off at the replacement value of around 2.1 
children per woman. 
24 M. Bruni, 2009 and for what relates to China M. Bruni, 2010 
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The demographic transition does normally start in a traditional economic setting, still 
largely dominated by the agriculture sector. The process of capital accumulation has yet to 
start  while  the  Replacement  demand
25 of  the  modern  sector  is  still  very  small  due  to  its 
employment size and age structure. The potentiality of the extra-agricultural sectors to absorb 
larger and larger waves of young people reaching working age is, therefore, extremely limited 
and  the  great  majority  of  young  people  entering  working  age  are  “accumulated”  in  the 
agricultural sector. 
In  China,  in  1952,  agricultural  employment  represented  83.5  per  cent  of  total 
employment and in 1970 it was still around 80 per cent. In this period, total population grew 
on the average by 14.2 million per year, rural population by 10.1 million. Given the very 
young  age  structure  of  the  Chinese  Population,  WAP  grew  on  the  average  by  “only”  7 
million, less of the combined average growth in agricultural employment (5.8 million), and in 
modern sectors’ employment (1.8 million). This result is explained by the fact that all rural 
population was considered “employed”.  
 
 
The next 20 years witnessed the beginning of China’s drive toward modernization, with 
employment in the industrial sectors growing on the average by 5.2 million per year, and 
employment  in  services  by  4.6  million.  Agriculture  continued  to  absorb  a  predominant 
portion of the new entrants in working age that numbered more than 21 million per year. We 
can,  in  fact,  estimate  that  the  yearly  average  value  of  the  Replacement  demand  of  the 
agricultural sector must have been equal to at least 6 million.  Given an Additional demand in 
excess of 5 million, the total number of first time entrants in the sector can be estimated at 
around 12 million per year.  
 
In 1991, agricultural employment peaked at around 390 million, 60 per cent of total 
employment, while rural population was close to the maximum value of 859 million that will 
be reached in 1995. So, by around 1990, the phase of excess labour accumulation in the 
subsistence sector is finished and the stage is set for the de-accumulation phase.  
 
                                                        
25 Replacement demand measure the number of young people that can enter employment for the first time to 
replace the workers that have definitely left the area of employment because of ageing, death or migration. The 
stock-flow model from which this concept is derived will be briefly discussed further in the paper. For a more 
detailed presentation seed M. Bruni 1988 and 2009.  
Tab. 1 - Population and employment; yearly  average increase in selected periods; million; 1952 - 2008
Urban Pop Rural Pop Total Pop. Total Empl. Urban Empl Rural Empl. Agr. Ind.  Services
1952-1970 4.0 10.1 14.2 7.6 2.1 5.5 5.8 1.1 0.7
1970-1990 7.9 7.8 15.7 15.2 5.4 9.8 5.6 5.2 4.6
1990-2003 17.1 -5.6 11.5 7.4 6.6 0.8 -2.0 1.6 7.3
2003-2008 16.6 -9.4 7.2 6.1 9.1 -3.0 -11.8 10.1 7.8
1952-1970  1970-1990  1990-2003  2003-2008 
Agr.  5.8  5.6  -2.0  -11.8 
Ind.   1.1  5.2  1.6  10.1 















Graph. 4 - China; Total employment by sector; average 
yearly growth in selected periods; 1952-2008 
Urban Empl  Rural Empl. 
1952-1970  2.1  5.5 
1970-1990  5.4  9.8 
1990-2003  6.6  0.8 










Graph. 5 - China; Urban and rural employment; average 
yearly growth in selected periods; 1952-2008    13 
 
 
Following  an  analytical  pattern  in  terms  of  stock  that  still  now  largely  hinders  the 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying the functioning of the labour market, Lewis did 
not discuss the dynamic of the de-accumulation process and relayed only on the growing 
demand of the modern sector. In fact, numerous other interacting mechanisms and conditions 
must be considered.  
In the first place, in the majority of countries that have historically experienced the 
presence of an unlimited supply of labour, and China is no exception, the excess of labour 
supply is largely localized in rural areas, while industrial development tends to be located in 
urban areas. In the second place, the geographical localization of industrial development does 
not necessarily give priority to the availability of local labour. This implies that the process 
through  which  the  modern  sector  absorbs  the  excess  of  labour  supply  present  in  the 
subsistence sector does normally require migration flows not only from rural to urban areas, 
but more generally to the geographical areas where economic development is taking place 
and where local labour supply is insufficient. Third, since the process of industrialization 
spans over a long period of time, ageing can represent a relevant way through which the 
unlimited supply of labour is progressively exhausted. Finally, it is extremely important to 
realize the difference between disguised unemployment, i.e. the amount of labour that can be 
released  by  the  agricultural  sector  (and  the  service  sector)  without  reducing  the  level  of 
production and the supply of labour that can be absorbed over a given time horizon by the 
modern sector. The difference can be relevant and will clearly emerge when we take into 
consideration factors such as the educational level and skills of the disguised unemployed, the 
presence of a drive to modernize the agricultural sector and the age structure of the disguised 
unemployed.  
Starting in 1990, employment in agriculture began to contract and this trend was soon 
shared by rural population and, in a much more pronounced way, by the rural population in 
working age. Between 1990 and 2003 the increase in industrial employment has been very 
modest  due  to  the  heavy  restructuring  of  State  Owned  Enterprises  and  has  been  largely 
exceeded by the growth in the service sector. However, taken together, employment in the 
two sectors grew, on the average, by around 9 million per year, while the agricultural sector 
lost two million employed per year.  
It must be understood that the fact that a sector’s employment declines over a given 
interval of time does not mean that the sector is not absorbing first job seekers, but that the 
number of people that have entered the sector is lower than the number of people that have 
exited  it.  At  the  same  time,  the  increase  in  the  employment  level  of  the  modern  sector 
underestimates  the  contribution  of  the  expanding  sectors  in  absorbing  first  time  entrants, 
whose number is equal to the sum of additional job positions created in the interval and the 
number of entries necessary to substitute the people that have definitely exited the sector.  
Available data do not allow estimating the number of first time entries in each sector in 
this  period.  Our  educated  guess,  based  on  the  employment  level  and  age  structure  of 
agriculture, is that every year between 1990 and 2003 at least 5 million young people have 
entered agricultural employment.    
However, it is between 2003 and 2008 that the process of de-accumulation of disguised 
unemployment has taken a decisive turn bringing numerous scholars to suggest that China has 
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reached  the  Lewis  Turning  Point  (LTP).  Whether  this  is  true  or,  as  other  scholars  have 
suggested, the LTP has not been reached and China still enjoys an excess of labour supply is 
an empirical question we will try to answer in the last part of the paper.  
3 China: a country on the move  
3.1 The floating population 
Our previous discussion has shown that the de-accumulation phase of the excess labour 
supply does necessarily imply migration flows from the areas where the subsistence sector is 
concentrated to the areas where the modern sector is developing.  
In  China  the  dimension  and  trend  of  internal  migrations  have  been  studied  mainly 
under  the  perspective  of  the  so-called  floating  population  (liudong  renkou),  a  concept 
generated by a system of rigorous residency registration adopted at the end of the ‘50s
26. 
Accordingly, the floating population is composed by those people that have resided at the 
place of destination for a given period without local registration status. Therefore, its size 
depends on the chosen length of the “period” and on the definition of “local”: the shorter the 
period and the smaller the area considered, the bigger the floating population.  
In  the  1990  Population  Census  the  floating  population  includes  people  who  have 
resided at the place of destination for more than one year. Starting with the 2000 Population 
Census
 the  period  is  reduced  to  six  months
27.  Moreover,  while  the  1990  Census  allowed 
measuring only movements inside each province and between provinces, the 2000 Census 
allows measuring also movements between counties and inside each county. It must also be 
underlined that the floating population does not include the “migrants” that are defined as 
those people that have obtained a local registration status in the place of migration. 
The  terminology  “floating  population”,  while  capturing  a  legal  aspect  of  the 
phenomenon, conveys a wrong image of the internal migration flows that have affected and 
are  affecting  China.  What  China  has  been  experiencing  in  the  last  thirty  years  is  not  a 
phenomenon of temporary or seasonal migration, but an exodus of unprecedented dimension 
of people looking for jobs and for a better future for themselves and for their families, and 
that  in  so  doing  have  largely  contributed  to  the  Chinese  economic  miracle,  providing  an 
unlimited supply of labour willing to work at a subsistence wage. The more recent literature 
does therefore clearly speak of migration and labour mobility
28. 
Liang  and  Ma 
29 have  provided  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  trend  and 
characteristics of the floating population up to the year 2000. According to these authors, the 
inter-county floating population has increased from 7 million in 1978 to 22 million in 1990. It 
was however during the 90s, and more specifically in the second part of the decade, that 
internal migration became a mass phenomenon. Not only it reached 79 million by 2000
30, but 
                                                        
26 The Hukou system -that was enforced in a rigid way until the beginning of the ‘80s- made internal migration 
illegal allowing to keep under control cities’ and towns’ public expenditure in education, health and social welfare. 
The system has been progressively liberalized, but still the great majority of rural migrants are not entitled to the 
same rights and benefits that urban citizens enjoy, no matter how long they have lived in the urban setting. They 
are still penalized by an above average presence in the informal sector, wage discrimination, higher incidence of 
wage arrears, exclusion from social security sand public services. In more general term, they are more vulnerable. 
The numerous studies devoted to the Floating populations have allowed Chinese scholars to point out the social 
and  ethic  shortcomings  of  the  Hukou  system  that  have  been  recognized  not  only  by  Institutions  such  as the 
National Population and Family Planning Commission, but also by the Chinese leadership.  As stated by Fang, Du 
and Meiyan (op. cit. p. 12): “The exclusion of migrants from the basic social security system is inconsistent with 
the overall goals set by the Central Government to equalize social welfare and public services between rural and 
urban residents.” For the moment “the Hukou system, because of its half-baked reforms as regard fundamental 
issues, still functions as an invisible wall that defines the different identities of urban resident and migrant workers 
from the countryside. And treats migrants differently”. Fang, Du and Meyan Wang, p. 7.  
27Fang Cai, Yang Du and Meyan Wang, 2009 
28 Ibidem,  
29 The size of the floating population was obviously grater considering also intra-county movements. Adopting this 
definition in 2000 the floating population amounted to 144 million (11.6 per cent). of the total Chinese population) 
and included 65 million people who had moved inside the county of residence.  
30 Up to 1978 rural migration was strictly prohibited. The first forms of labour mobility appear at the end of the 
‘70s, taking mainly the form of movements to township and village enterprises (TVE), under the policy: ”leave the   15 
three quarters of the inter-county “irregular” migration took place between 1995 and 2000. 
Since  in  2000  regular  migrants  were  around  20  million,  the  total  amount  of  migrants 
registered by the Census of that year was of around 100 million, i.e. almost 8 per cent of the 
total Chinese population. 
Moreover,  it  was  during  the  ‘90s  that  the  phenomenon  of  long  distance  migration 
became predominant. In 1990 out of 21 million migrants, only around 6 million (27.7 per 
cent) were inter-provincial migrants; by 2000 the number of inter-provincial migrants had 
grown  to  42  million,  53.9  per  cent  of  the  total,  and  2/3  of  the  increase  in  the  floating 
population registered during the period was represented by inter-provincial migrations. The 
long  distance  migration  was  directed  mainly  to  the  coastal  areas  and  to  the  two  main 
metropolitan areas: two third (63% per cent) moved to Guangdong, that accounted for almost 
one third of the total, Zhejiang (8.3 per cent), Jiangsu (6.6 per cent), Fujian (5.3 per cent), 
Shanghai (6.7 per cent) and Beijing (4.4 per cent).  
The 2000 Demographic Census recorded the presence of “irregular migrants” in all 
Chinese provinces, but it also showed that the phenomenon was heavily concentrated: the first 
ten provinces accounted for more than two third of the total and the last ten for a little more 
than  10  per  cent.  Guangdong  lead  the  ranking  with  21  million,  followed  at  distance  by 
Zhejiang (5.4 million), Jiangsu (5), Shanghai (4.4) and Fujian (3.8) (Table 2).  
If  we  consider  the  share  of  the  floating  population  on  the  provincial  population 
Shanghai ranked first (26.6 per cent), followed by Guangdong (24.7), Beijing (19.2), Zhejiang 
(11.8), and Fujian (11.2). In thirteen provinces the floating population accounted for less than 
4 per cent of the total population. 
The weight of long distance migration (interprovincial migration) on total migration 
ranges  from  almost  95  per  cent  in  Beijing  to  a  little  more  than  19  per  cent  in  Anhui. 
Numerous  reasons  can  account  for  such  a  difference  in  the  relative  role  of  urban-rural 
migration  and  interprovincial  migrations.  On  one  side,  the  relative  importance  of  rural 
population. Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai rank respectively first, second and fourth in the 
ranking  by  weight  of  migrants  coming  from  other  provinces,  while  Hunan,  Sichuan  and 
Anhui  occupies  the  last  three  positions.  Another  reason  is  certainly  represented  by  the 
probability to find a job, and therefore by the speed of economic growth. This does explain 
the fifth place of Guangdong and the seventh of Zhejiang. Development and political policies 
of the Central government encouraging migration to the frontier regions can then account for 
the third place of Xinjiang and the six place of Tibet.  
 
                                                        
land without leaving the village”. In 1984 they were encouraged to work in TVE and in 1988 in nearby small 
cities, but were not provided with coupons for buying food and other necessities in the local markets. At the same 
time the Chinese Government formulated policies facilitating rural labour transfers from the Central and Western 
regions. See Fang Cai, Yang Du and Meyan Wang, op. cit.   16 
 
 
A report just published by the National Population and Family Planning Commission 
puts the floating population at a record value of 211 million in 2009
31. The report contains 
data for 2005 similar to those we have just presented (Table 3). Being derived from the 1 per 
cent Survey run in 2005, they are not strictly comparable with those of the 2000 Census
32, but 
confirm some of the previous observations, while adding some possible suggestions about the 




31 The  Department  of  Services  and  Management  of  Migrant  population  of  National  Population  and  Family 
Planning Commission of China, 2010  
32 Some notable differences do also emerge between the structure of the floating population in 2000 presented in 
the Report and those for the same year published by Linag and Ma. 
Table 2 - Floating population by province; 2000
% distr.  % of Prov. 
Pop.
% of  inter-
provincial 
migrants
1 Guangdong      26.7 Shanghai       26.6 Beijing        94.6
2 Zhejiang 6.9 Guangdong      24.7 Tianjin        92.9
3 Jiangsu        6.4 Beijing        19.2 Xinjiang       73.6
4 Shanghai       5.5 Zhejiang 11.8 Shanghai       71.9
5 Fujian         4.8 Fujian         11.2 Guangdong      71.6
6 Sichuan        3.5 Xinjiang       10.4 Tibet          70.9
7 Shandong       3.4 Hainan         8.7 Zhejiang 68.0
8 Beijing        3.3 Tianjin        8.0 Hainan         58.4
9 Yunnan         3.2 Inner Mongolia 7.6 Fujian         56.3
10 Liaoning       2.9 Jiangsu        6.9 Ningxia        52.3
11 Hubei          2.8 Ningxia        6.7 Jiangsu        50.7
12 Hebei          2.7 Qinghai        6.4 Yunnan         46.3
13 Henan          2.6 Yunnan         5.9 Shanxi         45.7
14 Xinjiang       2.4 Tibet          5.8 Chongqing      45.6
15 Guangxi        2.3 Liaoning       5.5 Liaoning       45.3
16 Heilongjiang   2.3 Heilongjiang   5.0 Hebei          43.6
17 Inner Mongolia 2.3 Shanxi         4.5 Shaanxi        40.9
18 Hunan          2.2 Guangxi        4.2 Qinghai        40.3
19 Shanxi         1.9 Hubei          3.8 Shandong       38.4
20 Guizhou        1.6 Guizhou        3.6 Jilin          32.7
21 Anhui          1.5 Jilin          3.5 Guizhou        32.6
22 Shaanxi        1.3 Sichuan        3.3 Gansu          31.8
23 Jiangxi        1.3 Hebei          3.2 Inner Mongolia 30.9
24 Jilin          1.2 Shandong       3.0 Hubei          27.2
25 Chongqing      1.1 Chongqing      2.9 Jiangxi        25.1
26 Tianjin        1.0 Gansu          2.9 Henan          23.7
27 Gansu          0.9 Shaanxi        2.9 Guangxi        23.2
28 Hainan         0.8 Hunan          2.8 Heilongjiang   21.6
29 Ningxia        0.5 Jiangxi        2.5 Hunan          19.7
30 Qinghai        0.4 Henan          2.2 Sichuan        19.5
31 Tibet          0.2 Anhui          2.0 Anhui          19.4
China 100.0 China 6.3 China 53.9
Source: Zai Liang and Zhongdong Ma, 2004  17 
 
 
According  to  the  Report,  in  2005  the  floating  population  amounted  to  147  million 
people. Its distribution appears as concentrated as in 2000, the first ten provinces accounting 
almost for 67 per cent and the last ten for 8.8 per cent. Nine of the first ten provinces are the 
same as in 2000, the only difference being represented by the entry of Hunan and the exit of 
Yunnan. The Municipalities of Shanghai and Beijing have lost some positions, while the 
Provinces of Fujian, Shandong and Liaoning have gained some.  
The share of floating population has increased in almost all provinces and it is above 
ten per cent in the ten provinces with the highest values. Together with the Municipalities of 
Shanghai -where immigrants represent more than one third of the total population- Beijing 
and Tianjin, we have the costal provinces of Guangdong (26.5 per cent), Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Jiangsu and Liaoning. In the ninth and tenth position we find Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, 
while Hainan ranks 11
th with a percentage of 9.8 per cent.  
Surprisingly, according to this source, the weight of interprovincial migrants is lower 
than  that  estimated  by  the  Census,  the  only  exception  being  represented  by  the  three 
municipalities.  
The analysis by Liang and Ma contains some results that are of special interest to our 
analysis. The first relates to the presence and relevance of migrations flows moving toward 
rural areas. By 2000 more than 1/5 (30 million) of the floating population inclusive of the 
intra-county migrants had migrated to rural areas, a choice made by 25 per cent of inter-
province migrants, 19 per cent of intra-province migrants, and 9 per cent of the intra-county 
migrants. Liang and Ma suggest two possible main motivations. The first is that peasants in 
Table 3 - Floating Population by province; 2005
% distr.  % of Prov. 
Pop.
% of  inter-
provincial 
migrants
1 Guangdong      22.4 Shanghai       34.3 Beijing        97.7
2 Zhejiang 8.5 Guangdong      26.5 Tianjin        96.1
3 Jiangsu        7.6 Beijing        22.6 Shanghai       75.9
4 Fujian         5.8 Zhejiang 20.0 Guangdong      67.0
5 Shandong       4.8 Fujian         19.0 Zhejiang 63.2
6 Shanghai       4.5 Jiangsu        12.9 Xinjiang       49.3
7 Sichuan        3.9 Tianjin        11.8 Tibet          47.5
8 Liaoning       3.3 Liaoning       10.8 Jiangsu        44.0
9 Beijing        3.2 Inner Mongolia 10.7 Fujian         42.2
10 Hunan          3.0 Xinjiang       10.4 Hainan         35.9
11 Hebei          2.9 Hainan         9.8 Hebei          29.7
12 Inner Mongolia 2.7 Qinghai        8.3 Ningxia        29.3
13 Anhui          2.6 Jilin          7.1 Yunnan         27.5
14 Yunnan         2.4 Heilongjiang   7.0 Inner Mongolia 27.5
15 Hubei          2.2 Yunnan         6.6 Qinghai        27.3
16 Heilongjiang   2.2 Shandong       6.4 Liaoning       24.3
17 Henan          2.0 Ningxia        6.2 Shanxi         24.0
18 Jiangxi        2.0 Hubei          5.7 Chongqing      22.9
19 Guangxi        1.9 Hunan          5.6 Shaanxi        21.3
20 Shanxi         1.8 Sichuan        5.6 Shandong       21.3
21 Xinjiang       1.6 Chongqing      5.5 Guizhou        18.8
22 Guizhou        1.6 Jiangxi        5.5 Gansu          18.3
23 Shaanxi        1.5 Guizhou        5.4 Guangxi        15.7
24 Jilin          1.4 Shanxi         5.1 Jilin          15.7
25 Chongqing      1.2 Guangxi        5.0 Heilongjiang   14.7
26 Tianjin        1.1 Anhui          4.9 Hubei          13.9
27 Gansu          0.8 Shaanxi        4.7 Henan          11.9
28 Hainan         0.6 Hebei          4.3 Anhui          11.5
29 Qinghai        0.3 Gansu          3.4 Sichuan        11.0
30 Ningxia        0.3 Tibet          3.2 Jiangxi        10.6
31 Tibet          0.1 Henan          2.5 Hunan          8.9
Source: Report om China's migrant popultion 2010, based on the 2005 1% Population Survey  18 
relatively developed rural areas are engaged in non-agricultural activities and hire migrants to 
handle farm work. The second is migration for purpose of marriage
33.  
They  also  sustain  that  the  motivations  to  migrate  of  the  members  of  the  floating 
population and of the migrants are different. In fact, data seem to suggest that the difference is 
more of form than substance. For the floating populations the motivations connected to work 
weight for around 68 per cent and those connected to family reunion for 17 per cent, the 
former being predominant for people in the central age groups, the latter for the youngest and 
for the oldest. The main reasons given by migrants are education and marriage. This is not 
surprising since education and marriage are also the main motivations that allow to obtain a 
urban residence permit and then live and work in the urban environment. The conclusion is 
that the final motivation of all migrants is to find a better working condition and young people 
pursue this goal by moving to urban areas to complete their studies, and so obtain a residence 
permit. 
3.2 Migration balances 
The analysis of migration flows in terms of floating population can be seen as a mirror 
image of the analyses of international migration in terms of visa holders: the first concerns 
those that, according to Chinese law, are irregular migrants the second only regular migrants.  
The estimation of illegal residents in arrival areas has provided an indication of how 
many  people  are  contravening  the  residence  legislation,  but  has  not  allowed  to  clearly 
defining areas of departure and areas of arrival and measuring migration balances. As we 
have seen, and as should be expected, some floating population is in fact present, although 
with different intensity, in every province.  
The following figure provides a representation of the complex patterns of territorial 
mobility that can affect a country like China composed by many provinces and where each 
province includes urban and rural areas. 
Each province can be affected by movements between urban and rural areas.  Although 
we should expect rural-urban migration flows to be generally prevailing, floating population 
surveys  have  shown  than  consistent  movements  in  the  opposite  direction  are  also  taking 
place.  Each  province  can  then  express  emigration  flows  toward  other  provinces,  while 
receiving  immigrants  from  other  provinces.  Both  emigration  and  immigration  flows  can 
originate from urban and rural areas and be directed toward urban and rural areas.  
In this paragraph we will use the fundamental demographic identity to estimate total 
migration balances between rural and urban areas and between provinces, and analyze the 
complex inter-play of these two types of flows. 
Between 1995 (when rural population peaked at almost 860 million) and 2008, China’s 
total population has increased by 117 million, as a result of an increase in urban population by 
255 million, and a decline in rural population by 138 million
34 (Table 4). The rate of natural 
growth is available only for urban areas, while the data on fertility rates do suggest that 
natural growth is higher in rural than in urban areas. It is therefore safe to assume that rural 
areas have registered at least the same rate of natural growth as urban areas.  
 
                                                        
33 The data published by Liang and Ma allow estimating the migration balance of rural areas only at the intra-
county level, but not at the inter and intra provincial level 
34 In percentage terms rural population has declined since 1952 when it accounted for more than 87 per cent of 
total Chinese population, but the speed of the phenomenon has sharply increased in the last 15 years.     19 
 
On the basis of this conservative hypothesis, we have estimated the natural growth of 
urban and rural areas and then their migration balance as the difference between total and 
natural growth
35. Our computations show that between 1995 and 2008 at least 217 million 
rural dwellers have migrated to urban areas (table 4), contributing by 82.5 per cent to the 
demographic growth of urban population
36.  
Between 2003 and 2008, the Chinese population has increased by almost 36 million 
(+2.8 per cent), as the result of an increase in urban population by 83 million (+15.8 per cent) 
and a decline in rural population by 47 million (-6.1 per cent). The rural-urban migration 
balance can, therefore, be estimated in at least 68 million. Our computations do, therefore, 
suggest that the rural-urban migration balance has declined from an average yearly value of 
18.5 million between 1995 and 2003 to 13.7 million between 2003 and 2008.  
 
 
The literature on international migration has clearly shown that the process of rural-
urban migration is very often the premise for international migrations.  Indications that also in 
China migration to urban areas can represent the premise for longer distance migrations have 
emerged from the floating population literature. In order to obtain a more detailed picture of 
Chinese migration patterns, we have therefore estimated for each province the urban-rural 
migration balance and the inter-provincial migration balance.  
All Chinese provinces have been affected by the demographic transition, but provincial 
birth and mortality rates, and, therefore, provincial rates of natural growth, still greatly differ. 
Between 2003 and 2008, natural growth has been positive in all provinces, but natural growth 
rates range between values above 6 per cent in Xinjiang and Tibet, and values around or 
                                                        
35 What we are doing is to apply the basic demographic identity that TP at time t is equal to TP at time t-1 plus the 
Natural Balance (NB) and the Migration Balance (MB) between t and t-1. Therefore 
MB = Delta TP - NB 
36 According to Cai Fang and Wang Meiyan, 2010; “the increment of urban working age population has mainly 
come from in-migration of rural labor force in the recent years, and it is predicted that in about 2015, the amount 
of out-migrated working age population in rural area will be larger than the increase in working age population in 
urban area.” 
Table 4 - Urban and rural areas; demographic balances; 1995-2003
Urban  Rural Urban  Rural Total Yearly
1995-2003 172 -91 24 58 -148 -18.5 86.3
2003-2008 83 -47 14 21 -68 -13.7 82.5
1995-2008 255 -138 38 79 -217 -16.7 85.1
Rural-urban Migr. Bal. Imm. as % of urban 
pop. growth
Total Balance Natural balance  20 
below 1 per cent, in the municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, and in the Province 
of Liaoning (Graph 7). This shows that the Chinese provinces are largely spread along the 
path of the demographic transitions.  
 
 
Moreover, in the same period, total population has increased in 23 provinces (+52.5 
million) and declined in 8 (-17 million). Guangdong accounts for 47 per cent of the growth 
registered by the Chinese Population and for 32 per cent of the positive demographic balances 
at provincial level. The demographic growth of the first eight provinces by population growth 
(Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai) has been 
higher than the total growth in Chinese population and accounts for 70 per cent of the sum of 
the provincial positive balances. The demographic decline has been concentrated in Sichuan, 
Anhui,  Henan  and  Hunan.  In  substance  migrations  flows  have  played  a  major  role  in 
redistributing natural demographic growth over the Chinese territory.  
Applying the methodology previously suggested, we reach, in fact, the conclusion that 
30 million people have moved from 11 provinces of emigration (those characterized by a 
negative migration balance) to 20 provinces of immigration (those characterized by a positive 
migration balance (Table 5).  
 
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                        
            21 
 
Migration flows have also been heavily concentrated, the first eight provinces by size 
of migration balance having absorbed 28 million inter-provincial migrants, i.e. 91.9 per cent 
of  the  total  inter-provincial  migration  balance
37,  while  the  provinces  characterized  by  the 
highest  demographic  decline  have  registered  the  highest  number  of  migrants.  Our 
computations do, therefore, show that  the majority of inter-provincial migration  flows go 
from the provinces at the western border of the coastal area to the coastal provinces.  
 
 
The  following  graphs  documents  the  fact  that  in  this  phase  the  provincial  rates  of 
population growth are mainly explained by inter-provincial migrations (graph 8). 
                                                        
37 In 2008 these regions accounted for 31.2 per cent of total Chinese population, while the natural balances has 
been equal to 24.6 per cent of the national value. 
2003 2008 TB NB MB TB NB MB
1  Guangdong      80,069 96,881 16,812 3,224 13,588 21.0 4.0 17.0
2   Zhejiang       47,111 51,973 4,862 1,240 3,622 10.3 2.6 7.7
3   Jiangsu        74,552 77,929 3,377 914 2,463 4.5 1.2 3.3
4   Beijing        14,657 17,206 2,549 157 2,392 17.4 1.1 16.3
5   Shanghai       17,224 19,165 1,941 154 1,787 11.3 0.9 10.4
6   Tianjin        10,177 11,938 1,760 95 1,666 17.3 0.9 16.4
7   Liaoning       42,380 43,801 1,422 256 1,165 3.4 0.6 2.7
8   Shandong       91,856 95,592 3,735 2,741 994 4.1 3.0 1.1
9   Xinjiang       19,469 21,632 2,163 1,200 963 11.1 6.2 4.9
10   Hebei          68,140 70,945 2,805 2,317 488 4.1 3.4 0.7
11   Fujian         35,112 36,584 1,472 1,166 306 4.2 3.3 0.9
12   Yunnan         44,051 46,116 2,065 1,782 283 4.7 4.0 0.6
13   Shanxi         33,360 34,625 1,265 1,040 224 3.8 3.1 0.7
14   Shaanxi        37,145 38,188 1,043 824 219 2.8 2.2 0.6
15   Jilin          27,220 27,753 533 327 206 2.0 1.2 0.8
16   Hainan         8,164 8,669 505 400 106 6.2 4.9 1.3
17   Ningxia        5,839 6,273 435 336 99 7.4 5.7 1.7
18   Tibet          2,718 2,913 195 165 30 7.2 6.1 1.1
19   Jiangxi        42,823 44,664 1,842 1,826 15 4.3 4.3 0.0
20   Inner Mongolia 23,958 24,504 546 543 3 2.3 2.3 0.0
21   Qinghai        5,375 5,624 248 268 -20 4.6 5.0 -0.4
22   Heilongjiang   38,403 38,827 424 482 -58 1.1 1.3 -0.2
23   Gansu          26,203 26,677 474 891 -417 1.8 3.4 -1.6
24   Guizhou        38,957 38,503 -455 1,564 -2,019 -1.2 4.0 -5.2
25   Guangxi        48,893 48,887 -6 2,171 -2,177 0.0 4.4 -4.5
26   Chongqing      31,508 28,819 -2,689 575 -3,265 -8.5 1.8 -10.4
27   Hubei          60,419 57,972 -2,447 950 -3,396 -4.0 1.6 -5.6
28   Hunan          67,073 64,763 -2,310 1,902 -4,212 -3.4 2.8 -6.3
29   Henan          97,312 95,713 -1,599 2,717 -4,316 -1.6 2.8 -4.4
30   Anhui          64,526 62,276 -2,250 2,209 -4,459 -3.5 3.4 -6.9
31   Sichuan        87,578 82,609 -4,970 1,313 -6,282 -5.7 1.5 -7.2
Total  1,292,270 1,328,020 35,750 35,750 0 2.8 2.8 0.0
Pos. Bal. 52,474 35,750 30,620
Neg. Bal. -16,724 0 -30,620
Table 5 - Total population and demographic balances by region; 2003-2008
Absolute values in thousand % values
Table 6 - Provinces of immigration and emigration; 2003 - 2008 
Pop. 2003 Pop. 2008 Natural balance  Migr. balance Total  balance Natural balance % Migr. Balance %
378,025 414,484 8,782 27,677 36,459 24.1 75.9
417,979 433,994 13,567 2,448 16,015 84.7 15.3
311,104 296,439 6,949 -21,614 -14,665 -47.4 147.4
185,162 183,103 6,452 -8,512 -2,060 -313.2 413.2
 First 8 regions by positive 
migration  balance
Other regions with positive 
migration balance
First five regions by negative 
migration balance
Other 3 regions with negative 
migration balance   22 
 
Having documented the level of the rural - urban migration and the level and direction 
of the net interprovincial migration flows, we have then tried to understand and link these two 
typologies of flows.  
The  provincial  rates  of  urbanization  present  an  extremely  large  variance.  At  the 
national level, urban population has grown by 15.8 per cent.  Fifteen regions register values 
above  average,  the  ranking  being  lead  by  Yunnan,  Hebei,  Guangdong  and  Tianjin  where 
urban population has increased by around 50 per cent. At the other extreme 13 regions are 
characterized by values below 10 per cent or by negative values.  
According to our computations, in 23 provinces urban areas present positive migration 
balances  and  rural  areas  negative  migration  balances
38.  However,  in  a  sub-group  of  13 
provinces the process of urbanization is the result of both rural-urban migration flows and 
interprovincial migration flows, while in a second sub-group of 10 provinces emigration from 
rural areas exceeds the immigration in urban areas and therefore the provincial migration 




In 6 regions of the first sub-group (Beijing, Guangdong, Xinjiang, Tianjin, Liaoning 
and Zhejiang), that represents the demographic magnet of China, the role of inter-provincial 
migration is largely predominant and explains 70 per cent of the migration balance of urban 
areas. On the other seven, 92 per cent of the process of urbanization is due to rural-urban 
migration.  
                                                        
38 In table 3.5 the sign of the migration balance reflect that of the area considered.  In the case of Guangdong, for 
instance, the province has a positive migration balance of 13,588 million, the rural area a negative migration 
balance  of 4,387 million; therefore, the migration balance of urban areas (17,976 million) is the sum of the 
migrant to the region and the migrant from the rural areas.  
                   
           
        
       
  
      
       
       
       
                                                  
                                                     








































































































































































































































































Graph. 9 - Chinese regions; Percentage increase of urban population; 
2003-2008   23 
In the second group of regions, we can distinguish between those where rural migration 
has been directed mainly to urban areas and those where rural migrants have moved mainly to 
other provinces: Heilongjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Guangxi and Henan belong to the first group; 
Anhui, Sichuan, Chongqing, Hunan and Hubei to the second. 
The other 10 regions present other three different migration patterns: 
1.  In two regions, Jiangsu and Shanghai, the total migration balance is positive and has 
provoked an increase in both urban and rural populations; 
2.  In Guizhou, both the urban and rural migration balances are negative; 
3.  In  five  regions,  the  total  migration  balance  is  positive  and  the  urban  migration 
balance is negative; the result is a net process of ruralization. 
 
 
Therefore,  according  to  these  estimates,  in  the  last  five  years  the  process  of 
urbanization has affected 26 Chinese provinces, while data suggest that 5 provinces have been 
affected  by  the  opposite  trend.  In  the  first  26  regions  urban  population  has  increased  by 
around 78 million, 51 million coming from the rural areas of the same region and 27 million 
from other regions. In summary:  
Total  Urban  Rural
1 Guangdong 13,588 17,976 -4,387
2 Zhejiang 3,622 6,353 -2,732
3 Beijing 2,392 3,100 -708
4 Tianjin 1,666 2,538 -872
5 Liaoning 1,165 2,028 -862
6 Xinjiang 963 1,458 -495
7 Hebei 488 9,012 -8,524
8 Yunnan 283 4,579 -4,297
9 Shanxi 224 2,037 -1,813
10 Shaanxi 219 679 -460
11 Hainan 106 494 -388
12 Ningxia 99 597 -498
13 Inner Mongolia 3 1,597 -1,594
Sub-total 24,819 52,448 -27,629
14 Qinghai -20 106 -125
15 Heilongjiang -58 774 -832
16 Gansu -417 1,159 -1,576
17 Guangxi -2,177 4,011 -6,188
18 Chongqing -3,265 1,363 -4,628
19 Hubei -3,396 1,168 -4,564
20 Hunan -4,212 1,662 -5,874
21 Henan -4,316 6,086 -10,402
22 Anhui -4,459 3,565 -8,024
23 Sichuan -6,282 3,689 -9,971
Sub-total -28,601 23,583 -52,184
24 Jiangsu 2,463 1,673 790
25 Shanghai 1,787 392 1,395
Sub-total 4,250 2,065 2,185
26 Guizhou -2,019 -545 -1,474
27 Shandong 994 -2,116 3,110
28 Fujian 306 -690 996
29 Jilin 206 -141 347
30 Tibet 30 -1,344 1,374
31 Jiangxi 15 -4,048 4,063
Sub-total 1,551 -8,339 9,890
Migration Balance 
Table 7 - Total migration balances by province and urban/ rural; 2003-
2008  24 
•  Between 1995 and 2008, at least 217 million people (almost 15 million per year) have 
left rural areas to move to urban areas, but there are indications that this phenomenon 
is slowing down;   
•  Between 2003 and 2008, around 75 million people have moved from rural to urban 
areas, and other thirty million have moved between provinces -the areas of departures 
being represented mainly by the provinces west of the coastal regions and the areas of 
arrival by the coastal provinces- bringing the total migration balance to an astonishing 
level of more than twenty million per year;  
•  Some provinces have been characterized by a process of ruralization, a process of 
which we will find more evidence analyzing the provincial labour markets and that 
will deserve some more careful analysis;   
•  In spite of the extremely large inter-provincial differentials in natural growth, the 
provincial  levels  of  demographic  growth  are  explained  mainly  by  interprovincial 
migration balances;  
•  Finally, it must be underlined that all previous values refer to migration balances; this 
clearly  implies  that  the  amount  of  people  that  have  migrated  work  (floating 
population  and  migrants)  has  been  much  higher;  this  implies  that  the  notable 
difficulties encountered in estimating the floating population trough surveys and even 
Censuses bring to under-estimate the size of migration flows.  
 
4. The Chinese labour market: 2003-2008 
4.1 The long term background  
Between 1953 and 2008, Chinese WAP has almost tripled growing from 349 to 967 
million
39 (+618 million). One of the greatest challenges that China had to face was, therefore, 
that of creating a number of jobs coherent with its fast growing labour supply. According to 
official statistics, China has successfully faced the problem creating, on the average, 10.2 
million jobs per year.  
Although employment data must be taken with extreme caution, a more articulated 
analysis of employment growth during this period allows to highlighting a series of phases 
that  reflect  different  political  philosophies,  the  economic  policies  they  have  inspired,  the 
periods in which labour has been accumulated in the agricultural sector and the periods in 
which has been de-accumulated. 
A  command  economy  in  which  the  labour  market  is  obviously  totally  absent 
characterizes  the  period  up  to  1978.  In  this  period,  the  goal  of  eliminating  poverty  was 
pursued  through  a  system  of  cradle-to-grave  job,  wage,  and  retirement  security  that  has 
become known as the Iron rice bowl. From an economic perspective this period - that is 
remembered mainly for its violent power struggles, the collectivization of agriculture, the 
backyard furnaces, the Great leap forward, the Cultural Revolution- is dominated by the effort 
to create a dual economy based on a fast parallel growth of agriculture and industry. The 
increase  in  agricultural  production  was  pursued  to  sustain  urban  consumption  and  earn 
foreign exchange, while industrialization aimed to develop the heavy industry sector, a goal 
deemed necessary to make China independent from Russia. It is also punctuated by numerous 
economic downturns provoked by the implementation of inconsiderate economic policies and 
natural disasters. At the end of the period, the Chinese economy “was generally pictured as 
"on  the  brink  of  disaster"  due  to  its  various  imbalances  as  well  as  problems  of  low 
                                                        
39 In the same period total population has increased by around 753 million (from 545 to 1328). In 1950, with a 
total population of around 545 million China was the most populated country in the world and accounted for 
21.5% of world population. It also accounted for the largest share of births (more than ¼) and provided the biggest 
contribution to the increase in world population (around 23 per cent). In 2010, China is still the most populated 
country in the world. It accounts for 19 per cent of world population; its contribution to the total number of births 
registered in the planet has, however, decreased to 13.3 per cent and its contribution to the increase in world 
population to 11 per cent.   25 
productivity  growth  and  poor  incentives
40.  Although  years  of  extremely  high  production 
growth alternated with years of equally intense decline, GDP grew at an average rate of 6.2 
per cent and total employment by 7 million per year. It must however be underlined that 70 
per cent of employment growth (4.7 million per year) was concentrated in agriculture. Since 
WAP grew at an average rate of more than 14 million per year and rural population by almost 
16 million per year, it is evident that large quantities of surplus labour were accumulated in 




The year 1979 represents a milestone in the economic and social history of China, 
marking the beginning of the modernization phase during which the Chinese government has 
progressively  and  pragmatically  introduced  a  series  of  reforms  aimed  to  combine  central 
planning  and  market  in  order  to  increase  productivity,  living  standards  and  foster 
technological progress.  
From a labour market perspective it was at the beginning of the 80s that the Chinese 
government  started  to  grant  SOEs  autonomy  to  hire  and  dismiss  workers  and  adjust 
compensations in accordance with profitability and workers performance
41. In 1986 a new 
regulation
42 required SOEs to re-contract old workers and recruit new ones on the basis of 
voluntary contracts. The iron bowl system began to crack and with the introduction of labour 
market mechanisms Chinese workers started to be confronted with the problems of finding a 
job and facing the risk of unemployment. However, for the time being, SOEs were asked not 
to lay-off workers and total employment registered a massive increase (+17.8 million per 
year) in line with that of WAP, in spite of the notable slowdown in GDP growth registered at 
the end of the 80s. Although agriculture accounts for only 36 percent of total employment 
growth,  and  the  implementation  of  the  responsibility  system
43 contributed  to  increase 
agricultural output, it can be safely argued that also in this phase a large amount of excess 
labour was accumulated in rural areas, so that agricultural employment reached its historical 
maximum in 1991.  
 
                                                        
40 The major imbalances included an emphasis on capital construction and neglect of agriculture and light industry; 
emphasis on production and neglect of people's livelihood; emphasis on production and neglect of distribution; and 
emphasis on high accumulation and neglect of efficiency and consumption; see Amei Zhang (1996) 
41 Cai Fang, Du Yang and Wang Meyan, 2009, p.12 
42 Temporary Regulation on Labour Contract System of State Owned Enterprises 
43 Under this system, families lease land for a period of up to thirty years, and must agree to supply the state an 
agreed quota of grain or industrial crops at a fixed low cost in return. The remaining surplus can either be sold to 
the state or on the free market. 
    
    
    
    
    
   
  
  
   
   

























































































































Graph. 10 - China; Real GDP; Growth rates; 1961-2008   26 
 
 
In the following period (1992-1998) SOEs
44 started to face an increasing competition 
from the private sector that could also benefit from a massive inflow of migrants. This phase 
marks,  in  fact,  the  beginning  of  the  de-accumulation  process  of  rural  excess  labour, 
agricultural  employment  declining  at  an  average  yearly  rate  of  5.6  million  per  year.  The 
restructuring process of the public sector and the consequent lay-offs brought the Chinese 
authorities to strengthen the protection of urban workers, also through discriminatory policies 
against  migrants,  and  to  encourage,  both  politically  and  financially,  small  sized  private 
enterprises
45 (p12).  As  a  consequence,  in  this  phase  industrial  employment  registered  a 
moderate  growth  (+3.7  million  per  year),  while  the  increase  in  total  employment  was 
sustained mainly by the service sector (+9.3 million per year), characterized by a high level of 
informal labour relationships. It must, however, be underlined that it was in 1994 that the 
Chinese government adopted the Labour Law.  
The process of SOEs restructuring peaked between 1999 and 2002, a period in which 
GDP  growth  remained  on  the  average  below  10  per  cent.  The  increase  in  industrial 
employment generated by the private sector was not sufficient to offset the decline in public 
industrial employment (overall industrial employment declined on the average by 2 million 
per  year),  while  also  the  growth  in  the  service  sector  slowed  down  (+5.6  million).  As  a 
consequence, agriculture was called again to absorb a large portion of the increase in WAP 
that amounted in this period to around 15 million per year.  
The entry of China in the WTO marks the beginning of the present phase of Chinese 
economic development characterized by an increasing amount of FDI, a progressive decline 
of the public sector and growth rates that have averaged more than 10 per cent per year, in 
spite of the global financial crisis that has hit the world at the end of 2008. This phase has also 
                                                        
44 At  the  beginning  of  the  ‘90s  state  and  collective  firms  still  accounted  for  almost  80  per  cent  of  total 
employment. 
45 Cai Fang, Du Yang and Wang Meyan, 2009, p.12  
Table 8 - China; Total employment by sector; 1953 - 2008
Total  Agriculture Industry  Services
1953 213.6 177.5 17.2 18.8
1978 401.5 283.2 69.5 48.9
1991 654.9 391.0 140.2 123.8
1998 706.4 351.8 166.0 188.6
2002 737.4 368.7 157.8 210.9
2008 774.8 306.5 211.1 257.2
1953-78 174.7 117.0 39.0 19.0
1978-91 266.6 96.6 84.0 86.0
1991-98 51.5 -39.2 25.8 64.8
1998-02 31.0 16.9 -8.2 22.3
2002-08 37.4 -62.2 53.3 46.3
1953-78 7.0 4.7 1.6 0.8
1978-91 17.8 6.4 5.6 5.7
1991-98 7.4 -5.6 3.7 9.3
1998-02 7.8 4.2 -2.0 5.6
2002-08 6.2 -10.4 8.9 7.7
1953-78 3.6 2.9 9.9 4.4
1976-91 4.6 2.2 10.0 15.2
1991-98 1.1 -1.4 2.6 7.5
1998-02 1.1 1.1 -1.3 2.6
2002-08 0.8 -3.4 4.2 3.0
Absolute values
Absolute change 
Average absolute yearly change 
Average yearly percentage change  27 
witnessed the introduction of more detailed labour market regulations
46 together with a large 
expansion of the informal sector, a renewed process of de-accumulation of the surplus labour 
while registering the first signals of labour shortages, and a notable increase in labour unrest.  
 
4.2 Stock analysis  
Population by main age groups Between 2003 and 2008, the number of people in WAP 
has notably increased (+ 6.3 per cent). Even more pronounced the increase in the number of 
the elderly (+13 per cent), while the number of young people has sharply declined (-11.9 per 





Due to the consistent migration flows we have just documented, in urban areas WAP 
has registered a staggering increase (+19 per cent) and now represents more than ¾ of urban 
total  population.  In  spite  of  their  lower  fertility  rates,  urban  areas  have  also  registered  a 
modest increase of the younger generations.   
During the same time interval, in rural areas WAP has declined by 16 million (-3.1 per 
cent). The decline of the younger generations has been even more impressive (-35.1 million, -
18.7 per cent) and their weight has decreased by more than 3 percentage points. However, the 
share of the first age group remains much higher in rural (21.2 per cent) than in urban areas 
(16.3  per  cent).  Ageing  has  affected  more  rural  than  urban  areas  so  that  in  2008  the 
percentage of elderly has become higher in rural areas than in urban areas (8.5 per cent versus 
8 per cent). 
 
                                                        
46 Between the most relevant the Minimum Wage Regulations (2004), the Employment Contract law (2008), the 
Employment Promotion Law (2008), and the Labour Disputes Mediation and Arbitration Law (2008). 
47 In 1952 the share of WAP was 61.9 per cent while the percentage of young people was 33.6 per cent.  
Urban  Rural Total Urban  Rural Total
2003
0-14 97.6 188.0 285.6 18.6 24.5 22.1
15-64 386.0 523.8 909.8 73.7 68.2 70.4
65+ 40.2 56.7 96.9 7.7 7.4 7.5
 Total 523.8 768.5 1292.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
2008
0-14 98.8 152.9 251.7 16.3 21.2 19.0
15-64 459.3 507.5 966.8 75.7 70.4 72.8
65+ 48.6 61.0 109.6 8.0 8.5 8.2
 Total 606.7 721.4 1328.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2003-08
0-14 1.2 -35.1 -33.9 1.2 -18.7 -11.9
15-64 73.3 -16.3 57.0 19.0 -3.1 6.3
65+ 8.4 4.3 12.6 20.8 7.6 13.0
 Total 82.9 -47.2 35.8 15.8 -6.1 2.8
Absolute change  Percntage change
Table 9 -  Urban and rural population by main age groups; 2003 and 2008 
Absolute values Percentage composition
Absolute values Percentage composition  28 
 
 
A longitudinal comparison between the population by five-year age groups in 2003 and 
2008  presents  very  relevant  inconsistencies  that  are  reflected  in  an  amplified  way  if  we 
consider  separately  urban  and  rural  populations.  These  inconsistencies  do  not  allow 
comparing  the  working  age  population  structures  in  the  two  years  and  performing  a 
generational  flow  analysis.  Taking  for  good  the  2008  age  distribution,  rural  population 
presents a relative higher concentration in the first and in the last three age groups, while 
urban population is characterized by a relatively higher presence of people in the prime-age 




Employment – Between 2003 and 2008, total employment has increased by more than 
30 million (4.1 per cent) a figure that suggests a rather good performance of the Chinese 
labour market. It must, however, be pointed out that the increase in total employment “hides” 
the fact that almost half of employment growth is due to workers with 65 years or more. If we 
limit ourselves to employment in working age, the increase is of 2.3 per cent a relevant, but 
much less impressive result. 
The rural-urban perspective provides a first explanation of the migration flows we have 
previously discussed. Urban employment in working age has increased by 41.7 million (+16.4 
per cent), while rural working-age employment has declined by 25.1 million (-5.3 per cent). 
The percentage of urban working-age employment has therefore increased from 35.1 to 39.9 
per cent. More than 2/3 of the additional employed with 65 years or more, belong to rural 
areas, which implies that the large majority can be classified as disguised unemployed in the 
agricultural sector.  
2003 2008 Abs. Var. % Var
Urban 
15-64 253.8 295.5 41.7 16.4
65+ 2.6 6.6 4.0 154.8
Total 256.4 302.1 45.7 17.8
Rural
15-64 469.7 444.6 -25.1 -5.3
65+ 18.3 28.0 9.7 53.0
Total 487.9 472.7 -15.2 -3.1
Total 
15-64 723.5 740.1 16.6 2.3
65+ 20.8 34.7 13.9 66.7
Total 744.3 774.8 30.5 4.1
Urban/total
15-64 35.1 39.9 4.8
65+ 12.4 19.0 6.6
Total 34.4 39.0 4.5

















Graph 11 - Urban and rural WAP by 5 
year age group; percentage composition; 
2008 
Rur-Urb  Urban   Rural   29 
 
The average age of Chinese workers (42.9) is relatively high due the relevance of the 
agricultural sector. For the same reason, rural workers are, on the average, much older that 
urban workers. The difference in average age (44.8 versus 40) is accounted for by the fact that 
urban workers are much more concentrated in the age groups up to 44, while workers with 50 
or more years of age account for 1/5 of total employment in urban areas, but for almost 1/3 in 
rural areas. 
Rates of employment - As a result of the changes in WAP and employment, the 15-64 rate of 
employment has declined by around 3 percentage points, but remains extremely high (76.6 
per cent). Employment rates have declined both in urban and rural areas by a similar value, 
leaving the urban-rural differential almost unchanged. 
 
 
The urban employment rate of around 65 per cent suggests that a significant portion of 
urban employment (for instance in household services) is informal and is not captured by the 
surveys, while the value of around 88 per cent of rural areas reflect the fact that those that 
belong to an agricultural household are almost all automatically classified as employed in the 
agricultural sector. 
This becomes even more evident when we consider the specific rates of employment 
by five-year age groups (graph 13). In rural areas the specific rates of employment are up to 
100 per cent for all age groups between 30 and 50, and remain above 80 for the age group 
between 50-59.  More realistically, the urban rates of employment of the central age groups 
are around 80 per cent, while progressively increasing for the younger age group and rapidly 
declining for older workers.  
 
 
    
    
    
    
    
     
     
     
     





























































Graph 12  - Urban and rural employment by 5 
year age group;  percentage composition;  2008 
               
2003 2008 2003-08
Urban  65.8 64.3 -1.4
Rural 89.7 87.6 -2.1
Total  79.5 76.6 -3.0




The extremely high rates of total employment that characterize both men and women are 
reflected by their age specific rates of employment. For all age groups between 25 and 49 
men’s rates are largely above 90 per cent while that of the 50-54 just falls short of the 90 per 
cent  mark.  The  women’s  age  specific  rates  present  a  shape  similar  to  that  of  men’s,  the 
differential increasing up to the 25-29 age group and then stabilizing up to the age of 50. 







Employment by sector – In the five-year period we are considering, the increase in total 
employment  has  resulted  from  a  decline  by  59  million  in  Agriculture, an  increase  by  50 
million  in  Industry  and  by  39  million  in  Services  (table  12).    These  data  capture  a 
fundamental turning point in China with agriculture employment falling on the average by 
more than 3 per cent per year and employment in industry growing by more than 6 per cent, 
while the process of tertiarization continued at a steady pace (3.5 per cent per year). 
As a consequence, the weight of agricultural employment has declined by almost 10 
percentage points (from 49.1 to 39.6 per cent), while the weight of industry and services has 
reached respectively 27.2 per cent and 33.2 per cent. 
 
16-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Urban   18.9  59.6  77.8  80.6  80.9  80.8  76.2  61.4  47.3  30.0 
Rural   31.2  86.8  99.1  100.1  100.3  99.6  98.7  95.1  89.7  78.4 












Graph 13 - Urban, rural and total rates of employmenyt by 5 
year age group; 2008 
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Interesting results emerge when we consider the evolution of employment by sector in 
urban  and  rural  areas  (table  13).  According  to  our  estimates,  the  decline  in  agricultural 
employment is the result of a decline by almost 100 million in rural areas (-31 per cent) and 
of an increase by 41 million in urban areas (+97 per cent). At the same time 31 of the 50 
million additional jobs in the industrial sector (61 per cent) have been located in rural areas. 





As a result in 2008:  
•  The weight of agricultural employment has reached 27.5 in urban areas and declined 
to 47.3 in rural areas;  
•  The share of industrial employment has become quite similar in urban and rural areas 
(28.3% and 26.6 pr cent);  
•  The share of employment in the service sector remains strongly unbalanced (44.2 per 
cent in urban areas, 26.1 per cent in rural areas). 
These results suggest that the definition of urban and rural areas is no more consistent 
with the present situation. While it remains true that rural areas are specialized in agriculture, 
in 2008 the share of agricultural employment in rural areas has declined from 89 to 73 per 
cent, 59 per cent of industrial employees are rural dwellers as well as 48 per cent of the 
employed in the service sector.  
It is reasonable to suppose that in the last years industrial activities have been located in 
rural  areas  at  the  border  of  already  crowded  and  more  expensive  urban  areas,  while  the 
demand of agricultural products has boosted agricultural production and employment in areas 
close to urban centers.  
These  results  are  also  in  line  with  the  findings  on  the  floating  population  and  our 
analysis of migration balances that have indicated the relevance of migrations flows toward 
rural areas. It was generally assumed that this would necessarily imply movement of rural 
workers from farms, where they were disguised unemployed, to more productive farms. On 
the light of these results it could well be that at least part of these movements were in fact 
motivated  by  the  localization  in  rural  areas  of  industrial  and  service  activities,  while 
movements toward urban areas could be movements from one farm to another.  
 
2003 2008 2003 2008 2003-08
Abs. Change % Change Diff. 
Agriculture 365.5 306.5 -58.9 -16.1 49.1 39.6 -9.5
Industry 160.8 211.1 50.3 31.3 21.6 27.2 5.6
Services 218.1 257.2 39.1 17.9 29.3 33.2 3.9
Total 744.3 774.8 30.5 4.1 100.0 100.0 0.0
2003-08
Abs. Values % Comp.
Table 12 - Total employment by sector; 2003 and 2008
2003 2008 2003 2008 2003-08
Abs. Change % Change Diff. 
Urban
Agriculture 42.0 82.9 40.9 97.2 16.4 27.5 11.1
Industry 65.9 85.5 19.6 29.8 25.7 28.3 2.6
Services 148.4 133.7 -14.8 -10.0 57.9 44.2 -13.7
Total 256.4 302.1 45.7 17.8 100.0 100.0 0.0
Rural
Agriculture 323.4 223.6 -99.8 -30.9 66.3 47.3 -19.0
Industry 94.9 125.6 30.7 32.4 19.4 26.6 7.1
Services 69.6 123.5 53.9 77.3 14.3 26.1 11.9
Total 487.9 472.7 -15.2 -3.1 100.0 100.0 0.0
Abs. Values % Comp.
2003-08
Table 13 - Total employment by area and sector; 2003-2008  32 
 
 
If these observations would prove correct, they would just reinforce the idea that the 
urban - rural classification normally adopted by socialist and transition countries, tends to 
become obsolete once development set in and localization of both agricultural and extra-
agricultural activities start to have more complex motivations. 
Employment by educational attainment - China’s drive to provide basic literacy to its fast 
growing  population  has  been  a  very  successful  one.  Around  1950  the  literacy
48 rate  was 
around 15-20%. According to Census data, the literacy rate had increased to around 66 per 
cent by 1964, to 77 per cent by 1982, to 84 per cent by 1990 and to 93 per cent by 2000.  
In 2008
49, the rate of illiteracy of the population aged 15 or more was estimated at 7.8 
per cent
50. It affected mainly women and the rural population
51. Most importantly, it was 
concentrated between the elderly. In the same year the percentage of population (aged 6 and 
over) with at least a senior secondary education, college or more had reached 20.4 per cent. 
Beijing  (51.5  per  cent),  Shanghai  (47.7  per  cent)  and  Tianjin  (40.2  per  cent)  lead  the 
provincial ranking followed, at notable distance, by the other provinces with values included 
between 25.4 per cent in Jilin and 5.1 per cent in Tibet. 
Coming to the employed, between 2003 and 2008, the natural process of ageing and 
generational turnover has continued to progressively reduce the number and share of illiterate. 
However, while the number and the share of those with up to compulsory education has 
continued  to  increase,  the  number  and  share  of  people  with  high  school,  college  and 
university degrees does not show relevant changes. In 2008, less than 20 per cent of the 
employed had more than compulsory education and only 6.9 per cent a university degree 
(table 14). China educational gap with respect to more developed countries remains therefore 
very large.  
 
                                                        
48 In 1950 the government set recognition of 1,000 characters as the standard for literacy and 300 for illiteracy. 
Until 1978, adult literacy was given priority. A reading primer for peasant was distributed in 1951 to rural people, 
pinyin was developed; Putonghua became the standard and characters were simplified.  
49 The current literacy rate is set at 2,000 characters for urban dwellers and to 1,500 for rural dwellers.  
50 CNSB, 2009  
51 Women represent 74.1 per cent of the illiterate; 71.8% of the illiterate belong to the rural population.  
Agriculture  Industry  Services  Totale 
2003  88.5  59.0  31.9  65.6 
2008  72.9  59.5  48.0  61.0 









Graph 15; Weight of rural employment by sector; 
2003 and 2008   33 
 
 
The impact of China efforts on the educational sphere is well reflected by the fact that 
the percentage of employed with lower education increases with age, while that of the more 
educated presents the opposite trend: almost 30 per cent of the employed aged 16-29 have 
more than compulsory education, a percentage that declines to 10 per cent for those between 




On the average women are less educated than men: the difference is very small for the 




The  educational  level  of  rural  employed  remains  much  lower  than  that  of  urban 
employed (graph 16), the latter being characterized by higher percentages of employed with 
educational levels up to junior secondary education and much lower for employed with senior 
secondary  education  and  university.  It  must  also  be  underlined  that  78  per  cent  of  the 
employed  with  up  to  compulsory  education  work  in  rural  areas,  while  88  per  cent  of 
employed with university degree work in urban areas. 
Table 14 - Total employment by educational level; 2003 and 2008
No schoolingUp to compul. High school University
2003 52.9 539.4 101.3 50.7
2008 41.0 582.2 98.5 53.1
Diff. -11.9 42.7 -2.8 2.5
2003 7.1 72.5 13.6 6.8
2008 5.3 75.1 12.7 6.9
Diff. -1.8 2.7 -0.9 0.0
Absolute values
% composition
Tab. 15 - Total employment by sex, main age groups and education; 2008
No sch.  Up to compul. High sch. University No sch.  Up to compul. High sch. University
16-29 518 61,590 16,516 8,803 0.6 70.4 18.9 10.1
30-49 2,334 151,114 33,594 18,011 1.1 73.7 16.4 8.8
50-64 5,162 82,157 10,571 3,624 5.1 80.9 10.4 3.6
16-64 8,015 294,861 60,681 30,437 2.0 74.8 15.4 7.7
65+ 4,399 16,219 481 141 20.7 76.4 2.3 0.7
Total 12,413 311,081 61,162 30,579 3.0 74.9 14.7 7.4
16-29 887 57,981 13,217 9,070 1.1 71.4 16.3 11.2
30-49 6,617 147,846 21,389 12,417 3.5 78.5 11.4 6.6
50-64 14,441 58,503 2,703 1,035 18.8 76.3 3.5 1.3
16-64 21,945 264,330 37,308 22,522 6.3 76.4 10.8 6.5
65+ 6,617 6,765 61 15 49.2 50.3 0.5 0.1
Total 28,563 271,095 37,370 22,537 7.9 75.4 10.4 6.3
16-29 1,405 119,571 29,733 17,873 0.8 70.9 17.6 10.6
30-49 8,951 298,960 54,982 30,428 2.3 76.0 14.0 7.7
50-64 19,604 140,660 13,274 4,658 11.0 78.9 7.4 2.6
16-64 29,960 559,191 97,989 52,959 4.0 75.6 13.2 7.2
65+ 11,016 22,985 543 157 31.7 66.2 1.6 0.5







16-29 63.1 48.5 44.5 50.7
30-49 73.9 49.5 38.9 40.8
50-64 73.7 41.6 20.4 22.2
16-64 73.2 47.3 38.1 42.5
65+ 60.1 29.4 11.3 9.8
Total 69.7 46.6 37.9 42.4
Females/Total
Tab. 16 -  Total employment by sex, main age groups and 
education; percentage of women; 2008  34 
 
 
Unemployment – Unemployment does not receive much attention in Chinese labour market 
statistics. Estimates of the economically active population and employment allow computing 
the amount of “surveyed” unemployment. The Employment Centers provide the number of 
people  registered  (at  end  year)  in  urban  areas  and  information  on  their  demographic, 
economic and social characteristics.  
According to these sources, in 2008 surveyed unemployed amounted to 17.6 million 
and  registered  unemployment  to  8.9  million.  While  the  literature  suggests  that  surveyed 
unemployment refers only or mainly to urban areas
52, it is evident that -given the rules that 
govern the Employment Centers and therefore determine the number of people that have the 
right  to  enroll  together  with  the  incentives  to  do  so-  registered  unemployment  largely 
underestimates unemployment as defined by international standards
53. It must also be pointed 
out that the CSB publishes a time series of the “Registered Unemployment Rate in Urban 
Areas”, that seems to be computed as the ratio between the number of registered unemployed 
and the active population in the extra-agricultural sectors and is therefore not comparable 
with the standard rate of unemployment.  
We  will  therefore  limit  our  analysis  to  point  out  some  characteristics  of  urban 
registered unemployment that could provide some insights on the functioning of the urban 
labour market. However, it must be kept in mind that the characteristics that will emerge 
could  reflect  more  the  different  incentives  and  propensity  to  enroll  of  different  socio-
economic groups and the fact that a urban residence permit is a precondition for enrollment, 
than the real situation of the urban labour market.  
The average age of registered unemployed is relatively high (35 years), 47.9 per cent 
being  in  the  30-49  age  group  and  only  41.1  per  cent  in  the  16-29  age  bracket.  The 
concentration in the central age group is higher for women (53.4 per cent) than for men (42 
per cent).  
The largest proportion of registered unemployed imputes their situation to “companies 
problems” (table 17). This motivation is indicated by 1/3 of men and 24 per cent of women. 
                                                        
52 Cai Fang and others (2009) propose an unemployment rate computed as the ratio between surveyed unemployed 
and urban labour force, following a previous example in IMF (2003).   
53 According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), “the registered unemployed persons in urban areas refer 
to the persons who are registered as permanent residents in the urban areas, engaged in non-agricultural activities, 
aged within the range of working age (16-50 for male and 16-45 for female), capable to work, unemployed but 
desirous to be employed and (who) have been registered at the local employment service agencies to apply”. Such 
a definition brings necessarily to underestimate the level of urban unemployment since i) it considers only the age 
ranges 16-50 for men and 16-45 for women; ii) laid-off (xiagang) workers are not regarded as unemployed; iii) 
unemployed  persons  without  urban  resident  status  (hukou), i.e.  rural  migrants,  are  excluded;  iv)  unemployed 
persons have an incentive to register at their local employment service agencies if they expect to derive some 
benefit such as social security payments or improved job prospects, but many would neither qualify for social 
security nor expect to find employment by this means; seeJohn Knight, Jinjun Xue, 2006; pp. 3 and 4.  
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The age distribution is similar for men and women and is characterized by a concentration in 
the central age group and in the oldest ones, especially for men. The second largest group is 
defined as unemployed after graduation, a situation that we can probably redefine as “first job 
seekers”. This group represents almost ¼ of total registered men and 1/5 of total registered 
women.  In  both  cases  more  than  90  per  cent  is  less  than  30  years  old.  The  third  most 
important  cause  for  unemployment  is  “personal  reasons”  that  accounts  for  20.6  of  male 
unemployment and 17.4 for women. Almost ¼ of registered women motivate their situation 
on the basis of housework. They are concentrated in the age groups normally devoted to the 




The unemployed with up to compulsory education represent around 50 per cent of the 
total, those with senior high school weight for one third, and those with university degree for 
16.8 per cent On the average the educational level of men is higher than that of women. The 
percentage of unemployed with at most compulsory education increases with age, while the 
weight of those with university degree sharply declines with age (Graph 17). The percentage 
of people with a senior high school degree peaks in the central age group, but has a rather low 




A  comparison  between  the  percentage  composition  by  educational  level  of  urban 
employed  and  registered  unemployed  (Table  18)  would  suggest  that  the  people  with  the 
lowest educational level have the lowest unemployment rate, while senior high school and 
university graduates would register a much higher level of unemployment. At face value this 
could also be taken as an indication that the excess labour supply of unskilled labour has been 
exhausted. 
 
   













Men  1.6 1.1 24.9 33.6 20.9 4.1 13.6
Women  2.6 23.8 19.4 24.1 17.4 3.1 9.6
Total  2.1 12.9 22.1 28.7 19.1 3.6 11.5
                        
                        
                       
                     
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
                                                   
                                          
Up to Comp. SSS Univ.
Total  80.4 12.7 6.9
Males  77.9 14.7 7.4
Females 83.3 10.4 6.3
Total  49.9 33.3 16.8
Males  48.0 33.8 18.2
Females 51.6 32.9 15.5
Employed
Registered unemployed
Table 18  - Urban employed and registered unemployed by 
sex, percentage composition by educational level; 2008  36 
 
However, both conclusions are not warranted since educational level does certainly 
affect the propensity to enroll and only people with an urban resident permit can enroll in the 
Employment  Centers.  Moreover,  the  data  on  unemployment  duration  show  that  the 
percentage  of  long  term  unemployed  (more  that  12  months  of  enrollment)  declines  with 
educational level both for men and women (table 19). On the average, the percentage of long-
term  unemployed  is  higher  for  women  than  for  men.  This  appears  to  be  true  for  all 





The impact of the limitation to enrollment to urban residents emerges very clearly from 
the fact that the majority (58.7 per cent) of the people registered at the Employment Centers 
worked in the service sector, around 40 per cent in the industrial sector and only 5 per cent in 
agriculture (table 20). The shares of past workers in services and agriculture are higher for 
women. Almost 40 per cent of unemployed women come from the Sale sector and from the 
Hotel  and  Restaurant  sector  that  are  characterized  by  a  very  high  turnover  of  personal, 




The reliance on the enrollment in the Employment offices as a mean to find a new job 
is rather low -but not very different from that registered in countries like Italy where the 
functioning of the Public Employment Centers has received a lot of attention- and does not 
substantially differ between men and women. Friends and relatives represent the most sought 
way of looking for jobs. Interestingly, seven per cent of the unemployed hope to start their 





In conclusion:  
•  The  Labour  Force  Survey  provides  estimates  of  total  unemployment  that  are  not 
reliable and does not publish any information on its structure;  
Men  Women  Total
No Schooling 46.7 47.6 45.7
Primary School 35.9 43.4 40.1
Junior Secondary School 34.1 45.1 40.0
Senior Secondary School 36.7 41.7 39.3
College  28.1 25.7 27.0
University 26.1 27.4 26.7
Graduate and Higher Level 18.2 0.0 12.5
Total  33.9 40.9 37.5
Table 19 - Registered unemployed by sex; percentage of long term 
unemployed by educational level; 2008 
Total Sales Hotels and Rest.
Men  4.2 39.1 56.7 16.3 5.9
Women 6.5 33 60.5 28.3 10.5
Total 5.4 35.9 58.7 22.6 8.3
Agriculture  Industry  Services
Table 20 - Registered unemployed by sex; percentage distribution by previous sector of 
employment; 2008
















Men  13.9 52.9 2.1 9.7 8.3 13.1
Women 11.1 51.8 2.1 9.4 6.1 19.5
Total 12.5 52.4 2.1 9.5 7.1 16.4  37 
•  The information on registered unemployment is not comparable with ILO standards, 
while the level and structure of registered unemployment are affected by regulations 
that limit enrollment to urban residents and by the lack of incentives to enroll for 
numerous socio economic groups.  
Data suggest that the use of the Employment centers increases with the educational 
level and that the duration of unemployment is inversely related to education. As expected, 
registered  unemployed  rely  more  on  personal  relationships  and  initiative  than  in  the 
Employment centers to find a job, while one out of 15 hopes to start its own business.  
4.3 Flow analysis  
In the previous paragraphs we have analyzed the evolution and structure of the Chinese 
labour  market  from  a  stock  perspective.  Relevant  information  can  be  added  using  a 
generational flow approach.  
The objective of this approach is to estimate first time entries into employment (labour 
demand in terms of flow) and, if possible to analyze their structure by sex, age, sector and 
educational  level.  Given  two  geographical  areas,  it  also  allows  measuring  the  number  of 
passages from one area to the other, i.e. the migration balance.  
The generational flow approach is based on the idea that, in any given time interval, the 
number of young people that enter the employment area for the first time (labour demand in 
terms of Flows, LDF) is determined by:  
1.  The number of people who leave definitely the labour market (Replacement Demand, 
RD); 
2.  The number of additional jobs created by the economic system (Additional Demand, 
AD). 
Therefore: 
LDF[t-(t+1)] = t(RD + AD)t+1 
 
RD  is  always  positive,  and  its  size  depends  mainly  on  the  age  structure  of  the 
employed, but can be affected by the economic performance and by changes in the legal 
retirement age; the size of AD depends on the rate of growth of production and the level of 
technological change. Therefore, AD can be positive or negative. While the level of AD is 
measured by the increase in employment, RD is computed as the sum of the negative balances 
registered, in a given interval, by the cohorts of employed
54.   
Generational  entries  and  exits  –  Figure  2  provides  a  summary  view  of  the 
generational flows registered by the Chinese labour market between 2003 and 2008. Arrows 
indicates entries and exits flows, while the colored area represents the number of additional 
jobs created (or destroyed).  
 
                                                        
54 For a more detailed explanation of this approach see M. Bruni,1988 and 2009   38 
 
Between 2003 and 2008, 64.1 million young Chinese have entered the labour market 
for the first time. Twenty six per cent of the generational entries registered in this period are 
explained by the creation of additional jobs (16.6 million), 74 per cent by the replacement of 
people who have definitely left the employment area (47.5 million). In other words, every 
year 12.8 million young people have found a job for the first time, 9.5 million replacing old 
people  that  have  left  definitely  the  employment  area  and  3.3  million  occupying  new 
additional jobs.  
Entries  are  concentrated  in  the  first  two  age  groups  (Graph.  18),  accounting 
respectively for 42.1 per cent and 48.1 per cent. However, almost 10 per cent of first time 
entrants are aged 25-29. Exits of people 55 years or older represent almost 2/3 of totals exits.  
The  exits  in  the  central  age  groups  (30-39)  are  probably  accounted  for  by  women 
migrating to urban areas and leaving the labour market or, most probably, becoming informal 
labour in the service sector. 
 
The urban-rural perspective (Figure 3) allows to better understand the complexity of 
the present situation of the Chinese labour market. The urban labour market (that in 2003 
represented 35.1 per cent of total employment) has provided 53.8 per cent of the jobs taken by 
new entrants (almost 7 million per year). The rural labour market has provided the remaining 
6 million jobs positions to first time entrants. Moreover, around 3 million people have moved 
every year from rural to urban employment, bringing the number of people absorbed by urban 
areas to an average of 10 million per year.  
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It must be underlined that definitive exits from urban employment have been equal to 
7.5 million. Therefore, 84.7 per cent of total entries in urban employment are due to the 
creation of additional jobs. In rural areas total exits, including those toward urban areas, have 
been equal to around 55 million. However, since 25 million jobs were destroyed, only a little 
less than 30 million young rural people had the possibility to find a job in rural areas.  
Urban and rural data show a very different age pattern of entries and exits that do also 
provide the basis for estimating the movements from rural to urban employment of people 
aged 25 or more. First time entries in urban employment are concentrated in the first three age 
groups; entries in rural employment are concentrated in the first two age groups, the first 
accounting for 62.4 per cent. Therefore, the average age of entry in urban areas is much 
higher than that in rural areas, the main port of entry being represented by the 20-24 age-
group (53.8 per cent), while the 19-24 age group and the 25-29 age group weight respectively 
24.6  per  cent  and  18.2  per  cent.  This  is  coherent  with  the  fact  that  entries  in  urban 
employment include a higher proportion of entries in the modern sectors that require a higher 
educational level. The data by age group allow estimating 14.7 million passages from rural to 
urban employment that have affected workers between 25 and 44 years of age, the absolute 
value of each five-year age group decreasing with age.  
 
 
These migration flows find their explanation in the relative size of entries into WAP 
and employment in urban and rural areas. Between 2003 and 2008 the number of young 
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people that have entered Working Age Population at the national level has averaged around 
21 million, a number largely sufficient to face a labour demand in terms of flow of 13 million 
workers per year.  
Urban and rural areas present, however, very different situations. In urban areas, entries 
in WAP have averaged 9 million per year, a value largely insufficient to face a labour demand 
in terms of flows of 10 million per year. At the same time, WAP entries in rural areas have 
averaged 12 million per year, an amount far in excess of the six million required by the local 
labour demand. Rural-urban migration was therefore an unavoidable outcome of a structural 
lack of labour supply in urban areas and of a structural excess of labour supply in rural areas.  
The  continuous  improvement  of  China  in  providing  young  people  with  higher 
educational level and the availability of the market to absorb them is shown by the structure 
of entries by educational level: 41.9 per cent of first time entrants in employment have up to 
compulsory education, 47.9 per cent high school and 10.2 per cent university. Although still 
very far from that of more developed countries, this structure compares very favorably with 
that of the employed between 16 and 29 and indicates that the educational level of Chinese 




4.4 The provincial perspective  
Our previous analysis has suggested that the urban-rural divide still maintains some 
relevance,  but  its  significance  is  progressively  declining.  It  has  also  been  shown  that 
interprovincial  differences  not  only  remain  very  important,  but  China  is  witnessing  an 
increasing demographic and economic diversification at the provincial level. In this paragraph 
we will try to pursue this line of research with the objective of capturing some elements of the 
geographical complexity of the Chinese economy through an analysis of the provincial labour 
markets.  
Population by main age groups - The parallel decline in the number of young people and 
the increase in the number of old people that have characterized China between 2003 and 
2008 have been experienced, although with different intensities, by all provinces, with very 
few and marginal exceptions.  
Also  the  increase  in  working  age  population  has  been  a  widespread  phenomenon. 
However, 6 provinces have registered a negative trend, the decline being quite dramatic in 
Anhui, Chongqing and Sichuan (table 22). Therefore the increase in WAP by 52 million is the 
result of an increase by 62 million in 25 provinces and a decline by 10 million in 6 provinces 
(Table 22). Moreover, the increase in WAP registered by the ten provinces in which the 
phenomenon has been more pronounced accounts for 49 million, a value not very different 
from the national value.  
The  ranking  is  lead  by  the  coastal  provinces  of  Guangdong,  Zhejiang,  Shandong, 
Jiangsu  and  Hebei  that,  as  we  have  already  seen,  have  attracted  a  very  large  share  of 
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interprovincial migrants. Guangdong ranks first also by percentage growth (37.6 per cent), 
followed by the Municipalities of Shanghai (23 per cent), Beijing (22 per cent) and Tianjin 
(19.9 per cent). 
Data do therefore suggest that the Chinese provinces are located in different positions 
along the demographic transition paths of TP and WAP, and that the “natural” process is 
largely affected by relevant migration flows and the impact on fertility of the concomitant 




Total  employment  -  From  a  provincial  perspective,  the  growth  in  employment  by  30.5 
million (4.1 per cent) registered between 2003 and 2008 is the result of an increase by 35.7 
million in 22 provinces and a decline by 5.2 million in 9 provinces (table 23).  
Employment growth has been concentrated in nine provinces and in the Municipality 
of Beijing that have been responsible for almost 90 per cent of the positive employment 
balance,  while  90  per  cent  of  the  decline  in  employment  has  been  concentrated  in  four 
regions. 
The  rates  of  employment  growth  present  an  extremely  wide  rage  being  included 
between +26.5 per cent of Beijing and –5.7 of Shaanxi. Rates of employment growth higher 
than the national average have been registered in 14 provinces. They include all the provinces 
that have given the higher contributions (the only exception being Shandong) plus Tibet, 
Xinjiang and Hainan, and the two municipalities of Shanghai and Tianjin.  
Agricultural employment has decreased in all regions, while employment in industry 
and services has grown in all regions. These general trends deserve however a much closer 
analysis. 
Table 22 - WAP;absolute and percentage change by province; 2003 - 2008
1 Guangdong 19,583 Guangdong 37.6
2 Zhejiang 5,059 Shanghai 23.0
3 Shandong 4,564 Beijing 22.0
4 Jiangsu 4,474 Tianjin 19.9
5 Hebei 3,362 Xinjiang 15.3
6 Shanghai 2,831 Zhejiang 14.8
7 Beijing 2,481 Tibet 14.8
8 Yunnan 2,265 Ningxia 12.6
9 Shanxi 2,252 Shanxi 9.6
10 Xinjiang 2,062 Hainan 8.8
11 Shaanxi 1,681 Jiangsu 8.3
12 Henan 1,651 Qinghai 7.9
13 Fujian 1,614 Yunnan 7.5
14 Tianjin 1,522 Shandong 6.8
15 Liaoning 1,323 Hebei 6.7
16 Inner Mongolia 998 Fujian 6.5
17 Jiangxi 906 Shaanxi 6.3
18 Jilin 567 Inner Mongolia 5.6
19 Hubei 526 Liaoning 4.1
20 Gansu 510 Jiangxi 3.0
21 Ningxia 494 Gansu 2.8
22 Hainan 486 Jilin 2.7
23 Heilongjiang 398 Henan 2.4
24 Qinghai 295 Heilongjiang 1.3
25 Tibet 268 Hubei 1.2
26 Guangxi -241 Guangxi -0.7
27 Guizhou -529 Hunan -2.0
28 Hunan -974 Guizhou -2.0
29 Anhui -1,900 Anhui -4.2
30 Chongqing -2,778 Sichuan -6.2
31 Sichuan -3,855 Chongqing -12.3
Total  51,897 5.6
Positive values  62,174
Negative values -10,276
Abs. change  Percentage change  42 
 
 
Employment by sector   
Agriculture - Between 2003 and 2008, agriculture has lost almost 59 million workers, 
but with an employment share above 39 per cent remains the sector that provides the largest 
amount of jobs, a position that is almost certainly going to loose in the next five years. As we 
have already seen, agricultural employment has declined in every region, but also in this case 
the  large  majority  of  the  national  decline  has  been  concentrated  in  a  limited  number  of 
provinces, the first eleven explaining more than 3/4 of the total (Table 24).   
In percentage terms the decline has been above the national average in 13 provinces: 
they include 9 of those that have provided the greatest contribution to total decline, but also 
Shanghai, that ranks first (-38.9 per cent), Fujian (-19.8 per cent), Qinghai (-17.2 per cent) 
and Ningxia (-16.2 per cent). 
In 2008, twenty provinces can be classified both as rural and agricultural provinces 
since  they  were  characterized  by  a  percentage  of  rural  employment  and  agricultural 
employment above the national average.  
1 Guangdong 10.9 Beijing 26.5
2 Zhejiang 5.2 Guangdong 23.1
3 Jiangsu 5.1 Zhejiang 15.4
4 Beijing 2.6 Tibet 13.7
5 Fujian 1.9 Jiangsu 12.4
6 Yunnan 1.5 Tianjin 11.0
7 Hubei 1.4 Fujian 9.6
8 Shandong 1.2 Hainan 7.8
9 Jiangxi 1.0 Shanghai 7.5
10 Liaoning 0.9 Yunnan 5.5
11 Sichuan 0.7 Hubei 4.9
12 Shanghai 0.7 Xinjiang 4.4
13 Tianjin 0.5 Liaoning 4.3
14 Chongqing 0.5 Jiangxi 4.3
15 Xinjiang 0.4 Chongqing 2.5
16 Hainan 0.3 Shandong 2.1
17 Tibet 0.2 Inner Mongolia 1.6
18 Inner Mongolia 0.2 Sichuan 1.4
19 Jilin 0.2 Jilin 1.3
20 Guizhou 0.1 Qinghai 0.7
21 Hunan 0.1 Guizhou 0.6
22 Qinghai 0.0 Hunan 0.3
23 Guangxi 0.0 Guangxi -0.1
24 Shanxi 0.0 Shanxi -0.3
25 Ningxia -0.1 Hebei -0.3
26 Hebei -0.1 Gansu -1.4
27 Gansu -0.2 Henan -2.4
28 Heilongjiang -0.9 Anhui -2.6
29 Anhui -1.0 Ningxia -3.2
30 Shaanxi -1.3 Heilongjiang -4.7




Table 23 - Total employment by province; absolute change and % change; 
2003 - 2008 
Abs. change  Percentage change  43 
 
 
Industry - Employment in the industrial sector has grown in all provinces, but Beijing. 
However, the extraordinary growth in industrial employment that has characterized China 
between 2003 and 2008 has affected the various Chinese provinces in an extremely different 
way and its quantitative impact has been concentrated in very few. The five provinces that 
have  registered  the  highest  quantitative  increase  in  industrial  employment  (Jiangsu, 
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Henan and Shandong) account for more than 51 per cent of the total 
employment  growth  of  the  sector,  and  the  first  ten  for  77.5  per  cent.    Nine  of  these  ten 
provinces (the exception being Shandong) are also included in the thirteen that have been 
characterized by an increase in industrial employment above average. The other 4 are Hubei, 
Chongqing, Yunnan, and Qinghai. The high concentration of the industrial activities in China 
is clearly shown by the fact that only 9 provinces present an index of specialization above 
100.  The  ranking  is  lead  by  Zhejiang  and  Jiangsu  and  includes,  together  with  the  two 
municipalities of Shanghai and Tianjin, other four coastal regions: Fujian, Guangdong, Hebei, 
Shandong and Jiangxi. At the other end of this ranking we find all border regions (Jilin, 
Heilongjiang,  Inner  Mongolia,  Xinjiang,  Tibet,  Yunnan,  Guangxi,  Hainan),  and  Guizhou, 
Hunan and Gansu.  
 
1 Henan -8.1 Shanghai -38.1 Yunnan 158.3
2 Shandong -4.9 Jiangsu -32.2 Tibet 140.6
3 Jiangsu -4.6 Zhejiang -29.3 Guangxi 139.5
4 Sichuan -4.6 Chongqing -22.9 Hainan 135.9
5 Anhui -4.5 Henan -21.0 Gansu 133.7
6 Hebei -3.4 Anhui -20.9 Guizhou 132.4
7 Hunan -3.1 Fujian -19.8 Xinjiang 130.4
8 Zhejiang -3.0 Shandong -18.8 Inner Mongolia 127.5
9 Guizhou -2.4 Hubei -17.9 Hunan 125.3
10 Hubei -2.4 Hebei -17.7 Henan 123.3
11 Chongqing -2.1 Qinghai -17.2 Shaanxi 118.2
12 Yunnan -1.8 Sichuan -16.5 Heilongjiang 117.4
13 Shaanxi -1.8 Ningxia -16.3 Sichuan 113.7
14 Jiangxi -1.8 Guizhou -16.0 Ningxia 113.4
15 Fujian -1.7 Shaanxi -15.6 Jilin 112.9
16 Guangdong -1.4 Jiangxi -15.5 Anhui 112.9
17 Guangxi -1.4 Hunan -13.4 Qinghai 112.6
18 Heilongjiang -1.3 Heilongjiang -13.4 Hebei 103.0
19 Gansu -1.1 Tianjin -12.3 Jiangxi 102.8
20 Shanxi -0.7 Gansu -11.9 Shanxi 102.6
21 Jilin -0.6 Jilin -9.9 Shandong 94.5
22 Liaoning -0.6 Yunnan -9.3 Chongqing 93.7
23 Inner Mongolia -0.4 Beijing -8.9 Hubei 89.4
24 Shanghai -0.3 Shanxi -8.7 Liaoning 84.1
25 Ningxia -0.3 Guangxi -8.0 Fujian 78.7
26 Qinghai -0.3 Guangdong -8.0 Guangdong 71.6
27 Tianjin -0.1 Liaoning -7.4 Jiangsu 52.9
28 Xinjiang -0.1 Inner Mongolia -6.3 Zhejiang 46.0
29 Hainan -0.1 Tibet -2.9 Tianjin 39.2
30 Beijing -0.1 Hainan -2.8 Beijing 14.2
31 Tibet 0.0 Xinjiang -2.3 Shanghai 13.9
Total -58.9 Total -16.1
Abs. change  % change Index of localization
Table 24 - Employment in agriculture by province; absolute change,  % change and coefficient of 
localization; 2008   44 
 
 
Services  -  The  growth  of  employment  in  the  service  sector  has  been  a  little  less 
diversified  at  the  regional  level,  but  almost  equally  concentrated.  In  only  two  regions 
(Shaanxi and Guangxi) the employment level of the sector has declined. In fourteen the rate 
of  growth  has  been  above  the  national  level,  but  the  absolute  growth  in  these  provinces 
accounts for 87 per cent of the total. If we consider the Index of localization 16 provinces area 
specialized in services.  
 
 
1 Jiangsu 6.4 Guangxi 86.2 Zhejiang 170.6
2 Guangdong 6.3 Jiangxi 60.7 Jiangsu 162.9
3 Zhejiang 5.7 Guangdong 47.4 Tianjin 148.7
4 Henan 4.2 Chongqing 45.7 Shanghai 144.2
5 Shandong 3.4 Zhejiang 45.3 Fujian 130.6
6 Anhui 2.9 Jiangsu 45.2 Guangdong 122.7
7 Guangxi 2.8 Yunnan 44.9 Hebei 120.2
8 Sichuan 2.7 Fujian 40.2 Shandong 116.0
9 Jiangxi 2.4 Anhui 38.9 Jiangxi 100.6
10 Fujian 2.3 Hubei 38.0 Anhui 99.2
11 Hubei 2.1 Qinghai 35.5 Henan 98.4
12 Hebei 1.9 Henan 33.6 Chongqing 97.6
13 Hunan 1.8 Sichuan 31.9 Shanxi 96.8
14 Chongqing 1.6 Tibet 30.6 Liaoning 93.5
15 Yunnan 1.1 Hunan 29.0 Ningxia 92.0
16 Shaanxi 0.7 Hainan 23.9 Hubei 90.2
17 Guizhou 0.4 Shandong 23.0 Sichuan 80.4
18 Liaoning 0.4 Guizhou 18.3 Beijing 80.2
19 Jilin 0.3 Shaanxi 18.3 Qinghai 78.2
20 Shanxi 0.3 Hebei 18.1 Shaanxi 76.1
21 Tianjin 0.2 Jilin 15.9 Heilongjiang 75.4
22 Inner Mongolia 0.2 Inner Mongolia 13.0 Guangxi 73.5
23 Qinghai 0.2 Tianjin 12.2 Hunan 73.4
24 Shanghai 0.1 Ningxia 11.6 Jilin 73.1
25 Hainan 0.1 Liaoning 8.2 Inner Mongolia 61.9
26 Xinjiang 0.1 Xinjiang 7.8 Gansu 52.5
27 Ningxia 0.1 Shanxi 7.2 Xinjiang 50.3
28 Gansu 0.1 Gansu 3.5 Yunnan 45.0
29 Tibet 0.0 Shanghai 2.9 Guizhou 41.7
30 Heilongjiang 0.0 Heilongjiang 0.2 Hainan 41.5
31 Beijing -0.5 Beijing -15.3 Tibet 38.4
Total 50.3 Total 31.3
Absolute change  Percentage change Index of localization
Table 25 - Employment in Industry by province; absolute change,  % change and 
coefficient of localization; 2008   45 
 
 
In  conclusion,  data  show  the  extreme  diversity  of  the  Chinese  provincial  labour 
markets. The picture they suggest is that of a country composed by different geographical 
realities, affected by a process of change that is progressively widening the demographic, 
economic and social divides that intersect the country. In order to reduce the diversity to a 
manageable number of cases, we have classified the Chinese provinces on the basis of their 
economic specialization (table 27). 
Eighteen  provinces  belong  to  two  clearly  defined  groups.  The  first  includes  those 
provinces that not only are the less developed, but are also loosing ground with respect to the 
rest of the country; the second the provinces that have been leading the Chinese economic 
miracle.  We  have  then  classified  the  other  13  provinces  in  four  groups  that  represent 
intermediate cases.  
A first group of 12 provinces is specialized in agriculture. These provinces represent 
the agricultural core of China. With the exception of Inner Mongolia, their GDP per capita is 
below average; moreover in the last five years they had a rate of employment growth below 
average. However, 5 of them have registered positive, although very modest, inter-provincial 
migration balances, while registering rural-urban flows.  
At the other extreme we have a group of six provinces specialized both in industry and 
services. They epitomize the successful drive of China toward modernization and house not 
only the “factory of the world”, but also some of the biggest financial centers of the world and 
some  of  the  most  important  cultural  institutions  of  the  country.  Their  GDP  per  capita  is 
obviously above average; all of them have registered a rate of employment growth above 
average and in the last 5 years have attracted almost the totality of interprovincial migration. 
In spite of that, they have already registered relevant labour shortages and the first workers 
strikes.   
Another coastal province, Shandong, is specialized only in the industrial sector, but is 
also characterized by a relative high incidence of agriculture and services. If the relative lack 
1   Guangdong     6.1   Beijing       54.5 Beijing 218.5
2   Jiangsu       3.3   Tibet         49.6 Shanghai 166.3
3   Beijing       3.2   Yunnan        45.0 Tianjin 132.4
4   Shandong      2.7   Guangdong     37.9 Liaoning 124.2
5   Sichuan       2.6   Guizhou       32.0 Hubei 120.7
6   Zhejiang      2.5   Jiangsu       26.0 Guangdong 115.2
7   Henan         2.3   Hainan        23.2 Chongqing 109.4
8   Yunnan        2.2   Fujian        23.0 Guizhou 109.2
9   Guizhou       2.1   Zhejiang      22.1 Jilin 106.6
10   Hubei         1.7   Tianjin       21.2 Zhejiang 106.5
11   Hunan         1.4   Shanghai      20.4 Hainan 105.3
12   Fujian        1.4   Gansu         18.6 Jiangsu 104.6
13   Hebei         1.3   Shandong      18.4 Xinjiang 104.5
14   Liaoning      1.1   Henan         18.0 Qinghai 102.9
15   Chongqing     1.0   Sichuan       17.6 Tibet 102.1
16   Shanghai      0.9   Hubei         16.4 Fujian 100.3
17   Gansu         0.8   Chongqing     16.3 Sichuan 99.7
18   Anhui         0.6   Qinghai       14.8 Shanxi 99.6
19   Jilin         0.4   Hebei         14.8 Heilongjiang 99.5
20   Tianjin       0.4   Xinjiang      14.8 Gansu 98.9
21   Heilongjiang  0.4   Liaoning      13.6 Inner Mongolia 98.4
22   Xinjiang      0.4   Hunan         13.0 Shaanxi 97.9
23   Inner Mongolia 0.4   Jilin         10.9 Jiangxi 96.2
24   Shanxi        0.3   Ningxia       10.2 Shandong 93.4
25   Jiangxi       0.3   Inner Mongolia 10.1 Hunan 91.6
26   Hainan        0.3   Heilongjiang  7.2 Ningxia 90.6
27   Tibet         0.2   Shanxi        5.9 Anhui 85.3
28   Qinghai       0.1   Anhui         5.8 Hebei 79.8
29   Ningxia       0.1   Jiangxi       4.2 Yunnan 75.6
30   Shaanxi       -0.1   Shaanxi       -1.9 Guangxi 74.7
31   Guangxi       -1.4   Guangxi       -15.6 Henan 73.5
Total 39 Total 17.9
Absolute change  % change Index of localization
Table 26 - Employment in Services by province; absolute change,  % change and coefficient 
of localization; 2008   46 
of services could be seen as a potential weak point, at the same time Shandong represents an 
interesting case of an equilibrated productive structure. Its GDP per capita is above average 
and in the last five years the province had a positive migration balance.  
Hebei and Jianxi are in the transition phase from Agriculture to Industry and are still 
specialized in both types of activity. Although their GDP per capita is below average, both 
provinces have registered a positive migration balances in the last five years and Jianxi had a 
rate of employment growth above average.  
 
 
Hainan represents a unique case of a province specialized in agriculture and services, a 
situation that is obviously explained by the tourist vocation of the island. This has allowed 
Hainan, whose level of GDP per capita remains rather low, to register an employment growth 
above average and positive migration balances.  
Two regions (Hubei and Liaoning) and two Municipal cities (Beijing and Chongqing) 
appears to be specialized in Services  
Five regions are specialized in Agriculture and Services. This situation is justified, on 
one  side,  by  their  still  backward  economic  situation  and,  on  the  other,  by  the  heavy 
intervention of the central government due to political reasons. 
 
5  Lewis turning point and afterward 
The appearance in early 2004 of labour shortages in the coastal regions came as a 
surprise to economists and observers of the Chinese economy. Since then numerous papers 
have been devoted to the question whether China has reached the so-called Lewis turning 
Table 27 - Priovinces by economic specialization, 2008
Agriculture Industry Services Rates of Econ. Growth Migr. Bal. GDP per cap.
1   Anhui        
2   Gansu        
3   Guangxi      
4   Heilongjiang 
5   Henan        
6   Hunan        
7   Sichuan      
8   Ningxia      
9   Shaanxi      
10   Shanxi       
11   Yunnan       
12   Inner Mongolia
13   Fujian       
14   Guangdong    
15   Jiangsu      
16   Shanghai     
17   Tianjin      
18   Zhejiang     
19   Shandong     
20   Chongqing    
21   Hubei        
22   Liaoning     
23   Beijing      
24   Hebei        
25   Jiangxi      
26   Hainan       
27   Guizhou      
28   Qinghai      
29   Jilin        
30   Tibet        
31   Xinjiang       47 
point
55 at which surplus labour is no longer available and labour supply starts to be upward 
sloping. 
It has been observed that a rising supply curve of labour could have major effects on 
the Chinese economy: it could “eventually increase consumption, force major appreciation of 
the  real  exchange  rate  (either  through  currency  appreciation  or  inflation),  squeeze  profit 
margins, force industrial upgrading, shift China’s export specialization away from labour-
intensive products, and raise export prices. China’s comparative advantage could be expected 
to shift to more capital or technology-intensive sectors. This would also induce further global 
restructuring”
56.  
According to some authors
57, the first labour shortages were mainly due to the labour 
supply being unable to keep pace with demand for a series of contingent reasons: rising food 
prices  had  increased  income  in  the  countryside  and  living  costs  in  the  cities; insufficient 
information in emigration provinces; skill or age mismatch; insufficient implementation of 
the  regulation  aimed  to  reduce  the  discrimination  differences  between  areas.The  same 
authors do however suggest that the more recent labour shortages signal: “the beginning of 
the end to the ‘unlimited’ supplies of labour”, while “demographic transition implies that 
China may soon face much more serious supply constraint in the labour market, especially for 
unskilled workers, in rural as well as urban areas”
58. 
This  last  position  has  been  sustained  and  documented  in  a  series  of  papers  of  the 
Institute of Population and Labour Economics of CASS. One of the most recent
59 has brought 
a  series  of  rather  conclusive  elements  in  favor  of  this  thesis:  average  wages  for  migrant 
workers have started to rise in 2003 and in 2006 had increased by more than 10 per cent; a 
survey conducted in almost 2,800 rural villages has indicated that three out of four villages 
have exhausted their young human resources; finally, a probit analysis based on the data of 
the 1 per cent 2005 Survey has shown that, assuming unchanged the willingness to participate 
in  urban  labour  markets  and  the  structure  of  demand  for  rural  labour,  the  number  of 
agricultural workers available to work in the modern sector could be estimated at less than 44 
million.  The  authors  conclude  that  since  it  is  possible  that  economic  growth  and  rural 
development will modify farmers’ behavior and labour demand will switch to people with 
higher educational levels, the actual size of migration could be smaller than the estimated 
amount of people willing to migrate.  
A  different  position  has  been  maintained  by  Ma  Li,  former  director  of  China 
Population and Development Research Center and presently counselor to China's Cabinet on 
population issues
60. According to Ma Li “China will be able to maintain its development 
thanks to a sufficient labor supply for at least the next 40 years”. Ma added that according to 
calculations and estimates by the inspector of the migrant population management division 
under the National Population and Family Planning Commission: “the shortage of the labor 
force would not appear in the foreseeable long term. … China will see two peaks of labor 
supply, in 2016 and 2026, with 1 billion working-age people, up from 909 million in 2009. 
…. By 2050, the number of labor force will be equal to the level of 2020, higher than that of 
2009".  
 
5.1 Has China reached the Lewis turning point? 
In order to directly assess whether the Chinese labour market has already exhausted or 
is  going  to  exhaust  the  excess  labour  supply  previously  accumulated,  we  must  clearly 
distinguish  two  different  issues:  the  first  relates  to  the  presence  and  size  of  disguised 
unemployment; the second to the relevance of such disguised unemployment as a potential 
                                                        
55 The most vocal supporter of this thesis has been Prof. Cai Fang that has devoted many papers to this subject, 
some written with his colleagues of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.  
56 Garnaut, R. and Huang, Yiping. (2006), p. 19 
57 Garnaut, R. and Huang, Yiping. (2006), 
58 Ibidem 
59 Cai Fang, Yang Du and Meiyan Wang (2009a) 
60 China Daily, 30/03/2010   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labour supply for the modern sectors. We must also underline that in so doing we have to 
consider a time interval since the ageing process contributes to naturally reduce disguised 
unemployment, especially in a country like China where the process of labour accumulation 
started  60  years  ago  and  the  de-accumulation  process,  through  the  labour  demand  of  the 
modern sectors, 20 years ago. Finally, it is important to realize that migrations are not only 
related to the presence of surplus labour in rural areas, but more generally to the geographical 
lack  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  coherence  between  the  labour  supply  and  the  labour 
demand  in  terms  of  flows  and  are,  therefore,  the  result  of  the  interaction  between 
demographic  and  economic  factors.  In  substance,  the  exhaustion  of  disguised  agricultural 
employment does not necessarily imply the end of phenomena of internal mobility.  
Labour  productivity  in  agriculture  largely  differs  at  the  provincial  level,  ranging 
between a maximum of 21.300 RMB in Jiangsu and a minimum of 4.300 RMB in Guizhou; 
17  provinces  are  above  the  national  average  of  11.000  RMB,  14  are  below.  The  large 
provincial  spread  of  labour  productivity  in  agriculture  is  the  result  of  many  factors:  land 
fertility, availability of irrigation, typology of crops, level of mechanization, but it is also the 
outcome of different rates of disguised unemployment accumulation due, on one side, to the 
different  speed  of  the  demographic  transition  and,  on  the  other,  to  the  process  of  de-
accumulation caused mainly by internal migration and ageing.  
Keeping this in mind, and being therefore totally aware of the limits of the procedure 
adopted,  we  have  assumed  that  the  maximum  labour  productivity  present  in  Jiangsu 
corresponds to a situation in which there is no disguised unemployment, given the level of 
technology available at present in China. This allows measuring how many workers would be 
necessary to keep provincial agricultural output constant at that level of labour productivity, 
and  estimate  disguised  unemployment  as  the  difference  between  actual  employment  and 
productive employment. Under this hypothesis:  
•  Almost  50  per  cent  of  total  agricultural  employment  (150  million)  represents 
disguised unemployment; in other word if the labour productivity of Jiangsu would 
become  the  average  productivity  in  all  provinces,  156  million  farmers  would  be 
sufficient to produce the 2008 output;   
•  Disguised  unemployment  is  concentrated  in  few  provinces,  the  first  6  (Henan, 
Yunnan, Sichuan, Hunan, Anhui and Guizhou) accounting for 50 per cent and the 
first 11 for 75 per cent of the total.   
While the quantitative result of this procedure must be taken with extreme caution, the 
provincial distribution of the phenomenon is strongly supported by the fact that there is an 
almost  perfect  correspondence  between  the  provinces  we  have  defined  as  “emigration 
provinces”  and  the  provinces  in  which  there  is  still  the  highest  amount  of  disguised 
unemployment in agriculture.   
The  next  question  we  have  to  face  is  how  much  disguised  unemployment  can 
realistically be considered a potential labour supply for the modern sectors.  Age structure and 
educational level play obviously an important role. Moreover, as we have already underlined, 
to make this question meaningful we must define a time interval.  
In 2008, 37 per cent of agricultural employment in urban areas were 50 years old or 
more.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  at  least  the  same  percentage  applies  also  to  rural 
agricultural workers. Under this hypothesis, 114 million agricultural workers were at least 50 
in 2008 and other 35 million will reach the age of 50 by 2013. For what relates to educational 
level,  less  than  6  per  cent  of  the  employed  in  agriculture  have  more  than  compulsory 
schooling.  
Data do therefore suggest that the amount of disguised agricultural unemployed that 
could represent a potential supply of labour in the next five years amounts to less than 40 
million, a value that by en large corresponds to that proposed by of Cai Fang and other 
members of CASS.  
How much of this potential labour supply will transform itself in actual supply, and 
therefore in migration flows, will depend on factors such as the speed of the mechanization 
process in agriculture, the income differential between areas of departure and areas of arrival, 
the structure of labour demand by occupation and educational level.    49 
We can therefore safely conclude that in the next two or three years the labour supply 
curve is going to become upward sloping. 
 
5.2 Demographic and labour market scenarios: 2008-2023 
In the next few years China will cross an historical demographic divide, joining the 
growing number of countries in which WAP is characterized by a negative natural balance 
61. 
Table  28  reports  our  estimates  of  WAP  generational  turnover  in  absence  of 
international and internal migrations, for China as a whole and for urban and rural areas, for 
the three five-year periods between 2008 and 2023.  
Between  2008  and  2013  the  natural  balance  of  WAP  will  remain  positive  and  the 
Chinese population in working age will increase by 20 million. Starting with the following 
five-year period, Chinese WAP will start to decline at an average rate of 5 million per year 
that will become 8 million between 2018 and 2023. The phenomenon will be brought about 
by a contemporary decline in generational entries (that will decrease from an average value of 
almost 18 million in the first period to an average value of around 13 in the third period) and 
increase in generational exits (that will increase from a little less than 14 million to 21.6 
million). This trend will affect urban and rural areas that will both still register a positive 





From a labour market perspective
62, this implies that between 2008 and 2013 additional 
labour supply could still be coherent with additional labour demand if:  
i)  Employment  growth  would  only  slightly  decline  from  the  16.6  million  of  the 
previous period to 15.3 million;  
ii) The total rate of employment would remain constant.  
However, this second hypothesis is not very realistic. Between 2003 and 2008 the 16-
64 employment rate declined by three percentage points and it is highly plausible that this 
trend  will  continue,  due  to  an  increase  in  school  attendance  and  a  reduction  in  female 
(regular) labour market participation.  
Assuming a decline in the employment rate equal to that of the previous five-year 
period,  the  2013  working  age  population  of  987  million  could  produce  only  726  million 
employed. Therefore, China would have to import 14 million workers in order to keep its 
employment  level  constant,  and  other  7.5  million  for  every  1  per  cent  increase  in  the 
employment level. If the rate of employment growth would decline to 2 per cent over the 5 
year period, the total employment need -generated on one side by the decline in the rate of 
                                                        
61 See M. Bruni, 2009. 
62 For a detailed discussion of the future demographic trends in China and their implication on labour supply and 
international migration see M. Bruni 2011. 
2008-13 2013-18 2018-23 2008-13 2013-18 2018-23
Gen. Entries 89.1 72.3 66.9 17.8 14.5 13.4
Gen. Exits 69.0 94.6 108.2 13.8 18.9 21.6
Gen. Balance  20.1 -22.3 -41.4 4.0 -4.5 -8.3
Gen. Entries 35.0 28.5 26.4 7.0 5.7 5.3
Gen. Exits 28.8 40.6 49.0 5.8 8.1 9.8
Gen. Balance  6.2 -12.1 -22.6 1.2 -2.4 -4.5
Gen. Entries 54.2 43.8 40.4 10.8 8.8 8.1
Gen. Exits 40.2 54.0 59.3 8.0 10.8 11.9
Gen. Balance  14.0 -10.2 -18.8 2.8 -2.0 -3.8
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employment and, on the other, by the increase in the employment level- would be of around 
29 million workers.  
These considerations do therefore strongly suggest that China  will reach the Lewis 
turning point before 2013. In the following two periods the need of foreign labour will depend 
on the decline in working age population, the possible decline in the participation rate, the 
rate of growth in employment. All this strongly suggests that the need for foreign labour will 
largely increase making China the world biggest importer of foreign labour.  
A second point to consider is the concentration of additional jobs in urban areas. As we 
have already seen, between 2003 and 2008, the growth in employment was concentrated in 
urban areas that registered an increase of almost 42 million jobs, while employment in rural 
areas declined by 25 million. At the same time 12 of the 21 million first time entries in WAP 
took place in rural areas. The result was as a massive migration process from rural to urban 
areas. It is very probable that this process will continue. Data do however clearly show that 
WAP will start to decline in urban and rural areas approximately at the same time and the 
decline will be pronounced in both areas. It is therefore to be expected that in not too far a 
future China will need workers not only in urban areas but also in rural areas.  
 
6. Conclusions and policies 
The previous analysis has shown that the Chinese economy, and therefore the Chinese 
labour market, are characterized by an increasing complexity and regional differentiation that 
are the result, on one hand, of the different endowment of human and natural resources and 
economic vocations and, on the other, of the path of economic development followed by 
China in the last 20 years.  
At  its  onset  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  was  an  underdeveloped  agricultural 
country. Almost 90 per cent of its population lived of subsistence agriculture in rural areas, 
and more than one third of its total population was below the age of 15. In its first 40 years, 
China’s total population almost doubled, while its working age population increased by 119 
per cent. Although the process of urbanization was quite intense, the rural area absorbed 60 
per cent of total population growth and in 1990 still accounted for almost ¾ of the total 
population. On the meantime, the percentage of working age population had increased to 
around 67 per cent. Although according to official data, employment expanded at a very fast 
pace, both in industry and services, 60 per cent of total employment increase was accounted 
for by the agricultural sector, whose share of total “employment” remained above 60 per cent.  
In this phase the large majority of young people entering working age was “absorbed” by the 
agricultural sector, and a large majority could be considered disguised unemployment.   
In the last twenty years demographic growth has rapidly declined and, while urban 
population  has  increased  by  305  million,  rural  population  has  declined  by  120  million. 
Progressively smaller generations are entering the path of life, while the large cohorts born 
during the eighties are now in their prime age. As a result, the share of WAP has reached 
almost 73 per cent, and a relevant phenomenon of ageing is announced.  
In the last 10-15 years, the enormous drive to private industrialization, largely fueled 
by  FDI,  has  been  concentrated  mainly  on  few  coastal  provinces  that  offered  relative 
advantages in terms of transport, physical infrastructure and human resources. The vast labour 
demand generated by this process could not have been faced by local labour supply, but has 
exploited the large labour surplus present in the rural areas of the same province or of other 
provinces,  mainly  those  bordering  the  coastal  region.  It  must  be  underlined  that  this 
phenomenon of mass migration  –that did not affect only rural areas and whose dimension has 
been much bigger than that suggested by the official figures on the floating population- has 
taken place in the presence of laws and regulations that put all the economic, social and 
human burden of migration on the shoulder of the migrants.  
If evaluated on the basis of national parameters, China is still a developing country. 
According to the ranking of the World Bank, a GDP per capita of 3,687 USA dollars puts 
China in the 87
th position, while the IMF put China in the 98
th place. Moreover provincial 
GDP per capita presents an extremely high variance. In 2008 it was above average in only ten 
provinces. Its employment structure, with agriculture still ranking first with 39 per cent and   51 
services lagging behind at 33 per cent, is still very far from a modern structure in which 
services provide around 60, 65 per cent of total employment and agriculture between 3 and 10 
per cent.  
A high rate of growth sustained for a long period of time is therefore necessary if China 
wants to parallel its position of economic power due to its size with a living standard of its 
population comparable to that of the western world, while a huge restructuring in production 
and technology will be necessary. Moreover, our analysis has shown that China is faced by 
very important structural problems.  
In the first place a vey unbalanced economic growth at the provincial level not only 
contradicts the fundamental values of the country, but could represent the premise of a serious 
threat to its political and social stability, especially where it coincides with ethnic divides.  
In the second place, China presents a unique demographic situation. The speed with 
which  the  rate  of  fertility  has  dropped  coupled  with  an  extremely  fast  growth  of  labour 
demand is bringing to an end the phase of unlimited supply of labour. Everything indicates 
that not only very little excess labour supply is left, but what is left is concentrated far from 
the  areas  that  will  need  it.  Its  availability  will  therefore  require  internal  long  distance 
migrations.  
In  the  next  few  years,  labour  shortages  will  become  more  and  more  evident  and 
widespread creating a strong wage pressure that will affect not only the coastal areas and 
foreign  companies,  but  could  appear  in  other  areas  depending  on  the  reallocation  of  the 
manufacturing sector in the surrounding provinces. This will be accompanied by a growing 
awareness by the workers of their possibility to fight not only for higher wages, but also for 
better  working  conditions.  A  phase  of  labour  organization  characterized  by  a  greater 
institutional  independence  of  labour  unions  is  therefore  to  be  expected.  This  will  also 
necessarily  generate  a  greater  articulation  of  labour  contracts  and  notable  changes  in 
industrial relations.   
The problem becomes much more serious when we look a little farther in time. At the 
national level, WAP will start to decline around 2013-2015 and the phenomenon will become 
massive starting in the middle of the third decade of the century, but it will manifest itself 
much earlier and in a much more pronounced way in the areas where economic growth is 
more pronounced.  
The fast economic growth sustained by China in the last years has deeply diversified its 
economic  structure  and  affected  its  geographic  distribution.  The  result  is  a  much  more 
complex and complicated economic landscape. Up to know the Chinese economic policy has 
mainly aimed to provide general directives. From now on policies much more detailed, both 
at sector and geographical level, will be required. It is evident, for instance, that the shortage 
of labour that will characterize the coastal area and the wage pressure that it will entail, will 
provoke, on one hand, a possible restructuring of the local manufacturing sector and, on the 
other, the necessity to define new areas where to locate new economic clusters.  
This  process  will  imply,  first  of  all,  considerable  changes  in  the  way  to  conceive 
macro-economic policies and to look at economic planning. Macro-economic policies will 
need to be detailed at a more local level and be conceived in such a way to foster the interplay 
between the macro and micro levels and between public intervention and private investment, 
without forgetting that the market alone cannot reduce territorial economic unbalances and 
interpersonal income inequalities.  
6.1 Labour market policies 
For more than 60 years China has been able to generate rates of employment growth in 
line with those of WAP. In the first 40 years this goal has been achieved also through the 
accumulation of surplus labour in the agricultural sector, a surplus that in the following 20 
years has been a key element in allowing an extraordinary growth of the industrial sector. As 
we have already underlined, in the next few years this situation will totally change and WAP 
will start to decline. From a labour market perspective this implies that the number of people 
entering  employment  will  not  be  sufficient  even  to  cover  those  exiting.  This  will  make 
unavoidable to import labour from other countries if China wants to continue its path toward   52 
economic growth and higher living standards. How much and which typology of labour will 
be needed will obviously depend on numerous factors, many of which lie outside the scope of 
this paper. It is however evident that they relate to all the measures that can increase the 
employment income elasticity of the Chinese economy63.  
At the same time the Chinese labour market is still in its infancy and far from having 
reached a mature stage. Therefore, before facing this new and in many ways unexpected 
challenge China should try to adopt all the measures necessary to provide the premises for a 
well  functioning  labour  market,  including  regulations  providing a n  explicit  link  between 
employment and social protection.  
 
Labour market data and analysis - One of the main evidences that have emerged from this 
paper is that the available information on the level and structural characteristics of the main 
labour  market  variables  is,  to  say  the  least,  scanty  and  approximate,  a  problem  that  is 
aggravated by the fact that China is composed by provinces that largely differ with regard to 
their position on the path of the demographic transition, the level of human and economic 
development, the amount of key physical and immaterial infrastructures.  
It is moreover evident that human resources and the functioning of the labour market 
will play an increasingly relevant role in the choice of the future development path of China, 
while the Chinese Government will be \ confronted with an increasing necessity of devising 
complex sets of employment and active labour policies that will have to take into account 
provincial differences and disparities.  
It  appears  therefore  imperative  for  China  to  improve  its  tools  for  the  collection  of 
statistical information and more specifically its Labour Force Survey that need to be brought 
to  a  much  higher  qualitative  level.  More  specifically,  while  the  urban-rural  divide  is 
progressively loosing its relevance, the provincial level should assume a central role.  
If the collection of data is a responsibility of the Chinese Statistical Bureau, specialized 
institutions    (Labour  Market  Observatories)  should  be  created  with  the  responsibility  to 
provide  timely  labour  market  analyses  aimed  to  support  labour  policy  design  and 
implementation. The dimension and diversity of China would suggest that the most rational 
solution  would  be  the  creation  of  a  network  of  Provincial  Labour  Market  Observatories 
(PLMO) coordinated by a National Observatory (NLMO). The NLMO should be in charge of 
designing  a  blue  print  of  the  Provincial  Labour  Market  Information  System  (LMIS)  that 
should  include  all  relevant  information  on  demography,  labour  market,  education  and 
vocational  training;  provide  the  necessary  software  and  ensure  real  time  connectivity.    It 
would be up to the PLMO to create and update the Provincial LMIS that would then converge 
to the National Observatory. This will allow the NLMO to develop a comprehensive picture 
of the National labour market built on a comparative provincial framework and therefore 
allow the central government to design the general framework of labour policies, while the 
PLMOs could provide local authorities with the information needed to design, monitor and 
assess local employment and labour policies. 
In the last twenty years economists have concentrated their attention mainly on the 
macroeconomic and financial aspects of the Chinese economy, while very few papers have 
been  devoted  to  the  development,  functioning  and  shortcomings  of  the  Chinese  labour 
market, paying a marginal attention to the provincial level. If the lack of suitable data can 
partially explain the phenomenon, it is also true that labour economics and sociology do not 
have a large space in Chinese universities and with the notable exception of the Researchers 
of CASS, China has very few specialists working in this area. It is to be hoped that the 
increasing relevance of the sector will push Chinese Universities to devote more attention to 
the disciplines connected with the labour market both at the research and training level.  
                                                        
63 It is interesting to underline that India will face an opposite problem of creating jobs not only for a large number 
of  new  entrants  but  also  for  at  least  a  portion  of  its  underemployed  and  will  therefore  need  to  make  its 
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Migrants’ regularization - Our analysis has shown that the size of internal migration has 
been much larger than that estimated by the surveys on the floating population and that is 
characterized by complex patterns that are redesigning the distribution of the population not 
only between urban centers and the countryside, but also between provinces. Since the main 
determinants of migration flows belong to the economic sphere (on one side, the research of a 
permanent job and of a better life and, on the other, the presence of a structural lack of local 
labour supply in the fast developing coastal areas), it is clear that the great majority of past 
and future migrants will have no motivation or reasons to go back to their place of departures.  
Overall  the  situation  of  Chinese  internal  migrants  is  vey  similar  to  that  of  illegal 
migrants in western societies. Confronted with this situation, western countries had no choice 
but to proceed to regularize those immigrants that were providing the needed labour force to 
their economic systems. This solution was made unavoidable not only by ethical reasons, but 
by  the  necessity  to  warranty  a  regular  functioning  of  the  labour  market,  and  avoid  the 
problems generated by the presence of workers that could be exploited in terms of wages and 
labour  conditions.  Moreover,  the  presence  of  a  well  functioning  labour  market  normally 
requires a certain amount of internal mobility that represents the standard way through which 
the labour market pursues an efficient allocation of the national human resources. In western 
societies workers can freely migrate from one area to another maintaining the right to enjoy 
the same social services no matter where they decide to live.  
In  China  the  legislation  on  residence  permits  has  generated  a  two-tier  society,  the 
Chinese population being divided into two components that largely differ in terms of rights 
and social protection. Moreover, it has been shown that informal urban employment -that 
represents the most probable outcome of rural migration- implies higher working intensity 
and relatively lower pay, together with less social protection64. It is also true that migrants 
have to take the less attractive jobs that urban residents refuse to accept.  
From this perspective, estimating the future level of the floating population by simply 
projecting the past levels of this variable does not seem an interesting exercise
65. In the first 
place it is highly debatable that the concept of floating population will remain relevant since 
the functioning of the labour market will necessarily require internal labour mobility to ensure 
the quantitative and qualitative matching of the demand and supply of labour at the local 
level.  This implies that the legal restriction to internal migration will have to be abolished in 
order to avoid labour market distortions. In the second place, the real problem is not that of 
forecasting the number of people that will not be working where they were born, but to devise 
the necessary policies and instruments to facilitate the matching of the demand and supply of 
labour, in a situation in which a progressively larger number of areas will be characterized by 
lack of labour supply, while the excess surplus of labour will tend to be concentrated in a 
declining number of provinces.  
In conclusion, the consequences of the residence permit legislation is a problem that 
China will have necessarily to confront as soon as possible devising procedures aimed to 
regularize internal migrants in order not only to avoid distortions and tensions in the labour 
market, but also to prevent social unrest.  
 
Measures to increase the labour supply and improve its qualitative level – It has been shown 
that in the next few years not only the excess of labour supply will be completely exhausted, 
but  that  China  will  be  faced  by  a  structural  lack  of  labour  supply  generated  by  the 
concomitant effects of demographic and economic factors
66.  On one hand, WAP will start to 
decline as a consequence of a decrease in entries and an increase in exits, while the rate of 
participation will decline as a consequence of more and more young people taking part in 
                                                        
64Cai Fang,  Du Yang and  Wang Meiyan, 2009, p. 17. 
65 The  Department  of  Services  and  Management  of  Migrant  population  of  National  Population  and  Family 
Planning Commission of China, 2010. 
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higher education; on the other hand, the level of employment will have to continue to expand 
to sustain the economic growth necessary to improve the economic conditions of the Chinese 
population.  
The measures that can increase labour supply are those related mainly to fertility and 
retirement age, while an increased attention to vocational training and higher education will 
be required to improve the quality of the labour supply; at the same time the Employment 
Service  system  will  have  to  be  strengthened  to  make  more  efficient  the  process  of  skill 
matching and reduce the cost of internal mobility.  
 
One-child policy - Demographic forecasts show that in order to bring WAP to a situation of 
natural  equilibrium  around  the  middle  of  the  century  the  number  of  births  forecasted  for 
around 2030 should increase by more than one third
67. Therefore, at present, the problem is 
not that of debating if and in which measure the decline in fertility experienced by China in 
the  last  three  decades  has  been  due  to  the  one  child-policy  and/or  to  socio-economic 
development, but to evaluate if and in which measure its abolition could foster demographic 
equilibrium.  The  answer  to  this  question  is  extremely  difficult  since  the  experience  of 
countries that have been affected by a similar phenomenon is that the decline in fertility in a 
situation of growing average income presents an extremely high inertia. Moreover, it should 
be remembered that, according to Chinese data on population structure, in the next 20 years 
the number of women in fertile age will sharply decline.  It is however clear that the one-child 
policy is at present totally unwarranted especially if we keep in mind that the effect of an 
increase in the number of births would impact on the level of labour supply with a delay of 
more than 20 years.  
 
Retirement age – In the moment in which China will start to be affected by a lack of labour 
supply, a possible measure that the Chinese government could consider is the increase in the 
retirement age. Such measure would represent a coherent response to the increase both in the 
average age at death, that the Chinese population is presently experiencing, and in the average 
age  of  entry  in  the  labour  market,  due  to  the  longer  period  of  school  attendance  of  the 
incoming generations. It must however be kept in mind that, from a flow perspective, the 
impact of such measure would be only that of creating a temporary window during which 
WAP exits would decline, to then go back to approximately the previous level, after a number 
of  years  equal  to  that  of  the  increase  in  legal  retirement  age.  However,  from  a  stock 
perspective,  this  measure  would  have  the  permanent  effect  of  increasing  the  number  of 
cohorts  co-present  in  the  labour  market  and  could  therefore  counterbalance  the  probable 
reduction in the rate of participation of young people
68.  
 
Educational and vocational training - Another way to minimize the structural lack of labour 
supply is to increase the efficiency in the allocation of human resources. This goal can be 
pursued,  in  the  first  place,  by  planning  and  implementing  a  structure  of  the  entries  in 
vocational courses and higher educational paths coherent with the expected structure of the 
labour demand in terms of flows by occupation. In a phase in which the Chinese economic 
development will have to move to production processes based more and more on skilled 
labour and wages will necessarily increase, the role of vocational training and the capacity to 
provide a skilled labour supply will become a central element not only for sustaining the 
development of Chinese enterprises, but also for attracting foreign direct investment. The 
same is obviously true for higher education. As we have already seen the percentage of young 
people  entering  the  labour  market  with  a  University  degree  is  still  very  far  from  that  of 
western countries.  
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Employment  centers  and  internal  mobility  -  A  second  fundamental  step  could  be  the 
strengthening  of  the  Employment  Service  system  that  no  longer  meets  the  needs  of  an 
expanding labour market. Such a measure not only is necessary in order to improve skills 
matching at the local level, but could also greatly facilitate the correct allocation of human 
resources  at  the  national  level  minimizing  the  human  and  economic  costs  of  internal 
migration
69. According to a ADB project, an improved ES system “will reduce the costs of 
migration,  resulting  in  (i)  less  time  and  resources  spent  on  moving  and  job  seeking,  (ii) 
improved opportunities to find better and stable jobs; (iii) improved working conditions and 
rights protection; and (iv) higher earnings garnered in the longer term, thus improving living 
standards. At the macro level, strengthened ES will (i) reduce overall transaction costs, (ii) 
improve the effectiveness of the labor markets, and (iii) enhance sustained economic growth. 
In  substance:  “A  better  ES  system  will  lead  to  more  orderly  and  effective  rural–urban 
migration, which in turn will contribute to balanced development with less disparity between 
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